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SELF-REPRESENTATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ARENA: REMOVING A FALSE RIGHT OF 
SPECTACLE 
EUGENE CERRUTI* 
R.ecent historical scholarship has demonstrated that the practice of self-
representation at common law was developed and promoted not to secure a 
valued right to the accused but rather to compromise the defendant's ability to 
present an effective defense-by denying him an effective right to be represented 
by counsel. The Supreme Court in Faretta v. California stood this history on its 
head in order to read into the Sixth Amendment an implied right to self-
representation equal to the now preeminent right to counsel. The Faretta doctrine 
was carel£ssly adopted yet has been resolutely defended by the Supreme Court, to 
the almost universal chagrin of those most directly affected by its commands. The 
recent Supreme Court case of Indiana v. Edwards is only a modest retreat from 
the point/,ess imposition on the lower courts of a structurally and normatively 
incompatib/,e right within the context of the contemporary counsel-driven system 
of criminal justice. 
A putative right to self-representation sil£ntly entered international law via a 
back door at Nuremberg as a result of that tribunal's near-who/,esa/,e adoption of 
· the apparent rights and protocols of the common law adversarial system. It was 
subsequently adopted in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights as one of the standard "rights of the accused" but never actually put into 
effect in international law until the creation of the various war crimes tribunals 
of the last two decades. The right to self-representation has almost immediately 
replicated its experience in American law by creating a shameful series of 
disreputab/,e prosecutions. It has become another examp!,e of a feature of the 
adversarial system, like that of the lay jury, which does not travel well-or at 
all-to the international arena. The structural and normative groundings of 
the international system make the right even more inapposite there than it now is 
in the common law system. This artic/,e calls on the International Criminal 
Court, the new standard-bearer of international criminal justice, to take 
advantage of the upcoming seven-year review of its ru/,es and procedures to strike 
from its Artic/,es a practice that has been reduced to litt/,e more than a perverse 
right of spectac/,e. 
* Eugene Cerruti, Professor of Law, New York Law School. I would like to extend many 
thanks to Laurie A Moffat, now of Dewey & LeBoeuf, for her truly exceptional research assistance. 
© 2009, Eugene Cerruti. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The practice of self-representation in criminal proceedings began 
not as a right but as a punitive requirement of the early common law 
jury trial system. For centuries counsel was not permitted to represent 
the accused precisely because it was anticipated that counsel would 
make it less likely that the accused would be convicted. The practice 
gained limited normative status on behalf of the accused largely as a 
result of facetious rationalization by the common law courts in defense 
of the practice. There have been only several historical moments in 
both England and America where the practice has been genuinely 
regarded as a positive feature, allowing for popular resistance to 
politically inspired prosecutions. The contemporary recognition of a 
right of self-representation therefore has very limited historical ground-
ing, which is at best limited to the unique circumstances of the 
common law jury system. It enjoys virtually no recognition as a right 
within the criminal justice systems of civil law countries. 1 It has even less 
of a foundation, either normative or systemic, in the contemporary 
"mixed," or "hybrid,"2 systems of international criminal justice, which 
present to the accused neither a political sovereign to resist nor a 
fellow-citizen jury to appeal to. This article therefore argues for with-
drawing any recognition of the right (as opposed to the mere privilege) 
within the realm of international criminal justice and, particularly, 
within the rules governing legal practice before the much-heralded 
International Criminal Court (ICC). 
The proponents of a sui generis international criminal procedural law 
have gradually come to recognize that the adversarial criminal proce-
dure of the common law system does not travel well to the international 
arena. The structural and normative differences between the national 
and international systems are formidable. But the procedural template 
for war crimes prosecutions established at Nuremberg did at least 
recognize at the outset that one of the pillars of the common law 
system, the lay jµry, was untenable in the international setting.3 This 
1. Michael P. Scharr, Seif-Representation versus Assignments of Defence Counsel Before International 
Tribunals, 4J. INT'L GRIM.Jusr. 31, 35 (2006). 
2. The term "mixed" is commonly used to describe international tribunals that combine 
elements of both civil and common law systems while the term "hybrid" is now used to refer to 
tribunals which combine both national and international law and procedure. See Sarah M.H. 
Nouwen, 'Hylmd Courts': The Hylmd Category of a New Type of International Crimes Courts, 2 UTRECHT 
L.R. 190, 190 (2006). 
3. "In international proceedings the adversarial system has basically prevailed, but without a 
jury. This system has been predominant since 1945, when the procedure for the IMT [the 
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article aims principally to demonstrate that the practice of self-
representation, which has scant legitimacy even in the common law 
system, is absolutely incompatible with the structural and normative 
groundings of the emerging international criminal justice system. 
A certain unreconstructed mystique has shielded the right of self-
representation over the years. The iconic image it presents is one of a 
simple citizen, typically a social outcast or a proud political dissident, 
pleading for simple justice before a jury of his peers. It is a portrait of 
direct democracy at work, a self-represented individual throwing off 
the formal trappings of the state and its lawyers to present an unmedi-
ated narrative in the courtroom. It heralds the simple force of truth 
against the overly rationalized power of the state, the freedom to say 
"no" to both the power and the process of the prosecution. It champi-
ons a nostalgic sense of the simple liberties due the common man even 
in an age of highly regulated complexity. Unfortunately, this mystique 
presents an iconography that is not well grounded in either an histori-
cal or a normative truth. It is, as we shall see, a false construct that 
reverses and subverts the reality of the almost entirely negative histori-
cal experience with the practice of self-representation in the adversarial 
setting of the common law jury trial. 
This article argues that the current practice of self-representation is 
not simply a quaint or benign anachronism of the common law jury 
trial system. Rather it is, within the context of any mature and profes-
sionalized criminal justice system, a deeply cynical and irresponsible 
condescension to the accused. The best that can be said of the practice 
is that at the lower borders of any criminal justice system-where the 
cases typically bear no significant consequence-permitting pro se 
representation may not produce a harmful consequence.4 But there 
are no genuinely redeeming consequences to the practice. More 
commonly, as will be described below, the practice makes a broad and 
profoundly negative contribution to the cause of justice-particularly 
with regard to the accused himself. 5 
Nuremberg Tribunal] was being discussed in London." ANTONIO CAsSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAw 376 (2003). 
4. For a recent account of a typical below-radar trial involving a perfectly obnoxious 
defendant in a silly case where the defendant self-represented at a bench trial and was acquitted by 
the court, seeAnemona Hartocollis, A Noisy Train, a Fed-Up RUier and a Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
9, 2008, at Bl. 
5. Professor Hashimoto has recently conducted a study of records in both federal and state 
courts to demonstrate that the choice to self-represent is not necessarily irrational because of the 
widespread incompetence of assigned defense counsel. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right 
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In more serious cases civil law systems generally forbid self-
representation. This is a non-controversial position that is premised on 
the fairness and reliability of the civil law system itself. This article does 
not advocate such a complete prohibition within the international 
criminal justice system where the primary template is the common law 
adversarial (but nonjury) trial system. Rather, I argue in favor of 
reducing the status of the practice from a right to a privilege. The most 
obvious analog for this restructuring is the practice of trial by jury in the 
American criminal system. The American defendant has a near-
absolute right to be tried by jury but he has no right to be tried without 
a jury.6 American trial judges have broad discretion to deny the 
defendant the privilege of being tried by the court itself. The bitter 
morass of self-representation would be largely resolved if the trial 
courts had the same discretionary authority to deny the defendant the 
privilege of being tried without counsel, and to permit it only when, 
and under what circumstances, it would be appropriate. 
Recent scholarship on the history of the common law jury system has 
indirectly contributed a great deal to our understanding of the actual 
role of self-representation during that history, revealing not only more 
of the actual practice of self-representation but also of its very purpose.7 
of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Prose Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REv. 423 (2007). The 
study relies upon the extant literature to demonstrate the "breathtakingly low" competence of 
counsel and conducts a statistical study of the incidence and outcomes of pro se cases to suggest 
that prose defendants themselves do not appear to be directly harmed by rejecting such counsel. 
Id. at 467. The available data do not support a more controlled study that would have generated 
direct findings as to cause and effect of self-representation, as very generously conceded by 
Professor Hashimoto. The study provides no evidence of any positive reason for electing to 
proceed pro se-except perhaps for the questionable desire to present a non-legal "ideological 
defense"-as opposed to the strictly negative incentive of avoiding incompetent counsel. Id. at 
473. This study marks a significant contribution to a better understanding of the present posture 
of self-representation and the various negative incentives that may drive it. It is, however, a serious 
and ironic misreading of Professor Hashimoto's study to suggest that it demonstrates that all is 
basically well in prose land, as Justice Breyer appears to do in the recent case of Indiana v. Edwards, 
128 S. Ct. 2379, 2388 (2008). 
6. Singerv. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). 
7. There have been several excellent accounts of the history of the right to jury trial, see, e.g., 
WILLIAM FORSYill, HisrORY OF TRIAL BY JURY ( 1852), and the right to counsel, see, e.g., WILLIAM M. 
BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS ( 1955)' but there has been virtually no direct 
study of the actual role and status of self-representation throughout this multi-century history. The 
most recent contribution to this literature by John Langbein provides the most vivid and 
well-documented account of the actual role of self-representation as a polar restraint on the 
development of a right to counsel as well as the full panoply of rights now associated with the 
modem adversarial criminal proceeding.JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL 
TRIAL (2003). 
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In the earliest stages of the common law trial system the accused was 
not permitted to present much .in the way of an actual forensic defense 
to the charges. When the accused did finally gain permission to present 
such a defense he was not permitted to be represented by counsel, to 
call witnesses or even to testify under oath in his own behalf. He was 
permitted only to appear personally at trial and to provide direct 
responses to the evidence offered against him. "In short, the defen-
dant's position was one of standing alone without counsel, books, the 
means of procuring evidence or the right to offer evidence which he 
did possess."8 The purpose of self-representation was to promote 
self-incrimination.9 Self-representation began, in other words, as the 
default position that resulted from the denial of any other rights of fair 
trial or representation. 
As the accused slowly accumulated greater trial rights, most critically 
the right to be represented by counsel, self-representation continued as 
the default position only because most defendants could not afford 
counsel and there was no effective right to assigned counsel. The slow 
demise of self-representation began among the privileged classes who 
were not only the first to be afforded the right to counsel but also the 
first to be able to afford counsel.10 Progress towards a fair trial for the 
accused in the common law system has therefore been measured 
primarily in terms of the slow but steady movement away from self-
representation and towards the provision of professional counsel. 
Recent scholarship has demonstrated that the normative gloss of the 
common law courts that had long supported the default status of 
self-representation is therefore best understood as a post hoc rationaliza-
tion for a practice that was always recognized (quite openly in the 
earliest era11 ) as one that severely compromised the accused's ability to 
8. Joseph Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REv. 
1175, 1191 (1970). 
9. "[T)he rationale for the rule against defense counsel was to pressure the accused to serve 
as an informational resource at trial." LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 48. 
10. "Before 1695 one accused of treason or misprision of treason had no right to retain 
counsel, but in that year Parliament chose to create a preferred position for such defendants .... 
Members of Parliament were all 'political' figures, and the reform in 1695 reveals in eloquent 
terms their ideas of a fair judicial proceeding in a case where they might be involved personally." 
BEANEY, supra note 7, at 9. 
11. "[T) he very Speech, Gesture and Countenance, and Manner of Defense of those who are 
Guilty, when they speak for themselves, may often help to disclose the Truth, which probably 
would not be so well discovered from the artificial Defense of others speaking for them." 2 
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A 'TREATISE ON THE Pu.As OF THE CROWN (London 1721), cited in LANGBEIN, 
supra note 7, at 35. 
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def end himself. 
Ironically, the rather unlikely recognition of this practice as a funda-
mental right that inured to the interests of the accused did not fully 
arrive until 1975 in Faretta v. California. 12 This was a full decade after the 
Warren Court had finally completed the long march of the Twentieth 
Century to securing for all defendants in all criminal cases a guaran-
teed Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel. Prior to 
Faretta, no case had ever held that the Sixth Amendment also provided 
a guaranteed right to self-representation. The text of the amendment 
does not refer to such a right. There was also, as of 1975, no real 
call-either in the lower courts, the academic literature or the public 
narrative-to recognize such a right. The sudden recognition of a Sixth 
Amendment right to self-representation therefore was an ipse dixit 
creation of the Supreme Court. 
Yet there was, to be sure, a good deal of apparent support for the 
opinion in Faretta. Since no state had adopted a guaranteed right to 
counsel for all defendants, the widespread practice of self-representa-
tion by default had continued until well into the middle of the last 
century. Although a battle raged over extending the right to counsel, a 
"right" to self-representation remained a non-issue. Therefore, the 
colonial-era statutes and constitutional provisions that referred to a 
right to represent oneself in person remained essentially dormant. This 
silence could be construed to portray a long-term positive commitment 
to the practice of self-representation rather than an enduring negative 
commitment to deny guaranteed counsel. However well intentioned, 
Faretta largely misread the common law history it relied upon and 
constructed a false ideal for a practice that was utterly at odds with the 
new constitutionally driven system of defaults being developed for the 
American practice of criminal jury trial. The result of this self-
generated conflict between a guaranteed right both to counsel and to 
self-representation has been recurrent spectacles of self-represented 
defendants in serious trials who are either mentally ill, sadistic oppor-
tunists, pathetic voyeurs, nihilistic martyrs or just plain fools. This 
development has created a dismal state of affairs throughout the 
criminal justice system that is almost exclusively supported and main-
tained by the Supreme Court. 
The right of self-representation entered international law in the 
immediate post-Nuremberg era as one of the "rights of the accused" 
recognized in the seminal human rights document, the International 
12. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 13 This was, of 
course, law largely without context, for -there were no subsequent 
international criminal tribunals until the early 1990s with the creation 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (IC1Y) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (!CTR) .14 The exercise of 
the international right to self-representation first occurred before 
these two tribunals and several subsequent tribunals, where it was 
quickly exposed as a right without a reason. In particular, it has greatly 
disrupted and compromised the work of the IC1Y, the tribunal with the 
foremost influence to date on the creation of a viable international 
criminal justice system. It will almost certainly wreak even greater havoc 
on the integrity and efficiency of the operations of the ICC, the new 
standard-bearer for the promotion of international accountability for 
the most egregious violations of fundamental human rights. 15 The time 
has already passed to revoke the right from the rules of the various 
tempor4ry tribunals. But it is both timely and essential to remove the 
right from the statute of the ICC, the first and only permanent court of 
international criminal justice. 
This article will demonstrate the clear vacancy of continuing to 
recognize the right of self-representation in virtually any mature legal 
system, but most significantly within the apparatus of fundamental 
rights before the International Criminal Court. Part II presents the 
essential argument. It will engage the more recent historical scholar-
ship to discredit the broad mystique that has supported the common 
law claim to an individual right of self-representation. This Part will 
demonstrate that the practice of self-representation began as an instru-
ment of the state. designed to compromise, not serve, the interests of 
the accused. Whatever derivative interests of the accused the practice 
may have once served have diminished over time to the point of 
non-existence. Self-representation is not an inherent guarantee of 
individual autonomy essential to the philosophy of the adversarial 
system. It is a practice which was carelessly recognized as a constitu-
tional right in America and is now increasingly in disrepute within the 
judiciary and the scholarly literature. It is presently a practice which 
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(3)(d), GA Res. 2200A 
(XXI) Dec. 16, 1966, T.I.AS. No. 14668, 99 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter "ICCPR"]. 
14. The ICIY was established in May 1 ~93. International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, 
S.C. Res. 827, U.N.Doc. S/RES/827 (May25, 1993). The ICTR was established in November 1994. 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
15. The ICC was established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. l,July 17, 1998, 371.L.M. 999. 
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stands in fundamental conflict with the legitimate interests of both the 
accused and the legal system itself. It is a practice that should therefore 
be severely circumscribed by any system aspiring to a more advanced 
degree of fundamental fairness and integrity. 
Part III will demonstrate how the right, even within the context of 
modern Anglo-American jury trials, has become an odious impediment 
to providing a fair and reputable trial to the accused. The Supreme 
Court has created a right-based doctrine that focuses almost entirely 
upon a false construct of the putative libertarian interests of the 
accused. The point advanced in this Part is that it is not only the 
accused who becomes the aphoristic fool; the entire trial proceeding 
and all of its primary participants are equally implicated in and 
compromised by the essential foolishness. This Part will largely let the 
actual trial stories of some of the more notable cases speak for them-
selves to demonstrate the pervasive harms generated by the right. 
Part IV will explain how the traditional norms associated with the 
right of self-representation have absolutely no transfer application to 
the unique structural and normative schemes of the international 
criminal tribunals. A right of self-representation entered international 
law as part of a near-wholesale adoption of the common law adversarial 
trial at Nuremberg and has only recently been vetted within the unique 
and disparate context of the emerging international system of criminal 
justice. This Part will demonstrate that even within the short history of 
the temporary international tribunals, the right has already clearly 
established its ability to frustrate and compromise the pursuit of a fair 
and reputable trial for some of the most horrendous crimes of the era. 
II. THE ~OAD TO FAREITA 
Self-representation has always served the interests of the state and 
rarely, if ever, the interests of the accused. The practice of self-
representation began as a mere incidental feature of the primitive 
common law jury system. But the practice was maintained long after the 
more rudimentary stages of jury trial developments, due to its enor-
mous political utility to the state. As the common law jury practice 
matured and became increasingly complex, a right of counsel became 
critical to a fair trial. It also enabled the development of other nascent 
rights dependent upon the presence of counsel, such as the right to 
remain silent at trial. The default status of self-representation was not 
vanquished in America until the emergence of a guaranteed right to 
counsel in the middle of the last century. Ironically, it was not until 
after these protracted developments that the Supreme Court decided 
that virtually every criminal defendant in America had an absolute 
926 [Vol. 40 
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right to surrender these new and fundamental rights and proceed to 
trial without the benefit of counsel. 
A. The Early Period 
In the early period of the criminal jury trial, beginning in the 
Thirteenth Century, the accused possessed no right to testify in his own 
behalf, to confront his actual accusers, to compel witnesses for his 
defense or to be represented by counsel. 16 He appeared personally 
before the trial jury, which was often composed of members of the 
same self-informed panel that had already voted to initiate the charges 
(the forerunner to today's grand jury), 17 and was subject to questioning 
by both the judge and jurors. 18 "The accused conducted his own 
defense, as a running bicker with the accusers. Replying in person to 
the charges and the evidence against him was the only practical means 
of defense that the procedure allowed."19 Modest allowances to this 
primitive adversarial practice were introduced over time but the com-
mon law of England clung to the belief that an individual accused of 
crime should not be aided by counsel in presenting his case to the jury. 
Counsel was permitted to assist the defendant with regard to technical 
matters of law but was strictly prohibited from appearing at trial to 
argue the factual case to the jury.20 Indeed, it was not until 1836, by 
statute, that the English criminal defendant was permitted the right to 
have counsel appear on his behalf with regard to matters of both law 
and fact. 21 This restriction on counsel and the obligation of the 
defendant to appear and answer orally was a well-determined feature of 
English criminal procedure throughout this period. 22 The recent 
historical scholarship of John Langbein regarding the critical transi-
tion of the common law jury trial from a simple accusatorial to a highly 
adversarial proceeding has demonstrated the overriding purpose of 
16. "One accused of a capital offense-and all serious offenses were capital-faced his 
accusers without witnesses, without counsel, even without assurance of opportunity to question 
the witnesses against him." J.A. GRANT, OUR COMMON LAW CONSTITUTION 1 (1960). 
17. LEONARD W. l.Ew, THE PALIADIUM OF JUSTICE: ORIGINS OF THE TRW. BY JURY 18-19 
(1999). 
18. LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 319. 
19. Id. at 253. 
20. Id. at 26-28. 
21. 6&7 Wil. 4, c. 114 (1836). 
22. "English criminal procedure was for centuries organized on the principle that a person 
accused of having committed a serious crime should not be represented by counsel at trial." 
LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 10. 
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the early insistence on an uncounseled defendant: "allowing him 
counsel would work to his advantage by hampering the trial court's 
ability to convict him if he were guilty."23 
The common law courts were prone to rationalizing this punitive 
restriction as a protocol designed to benefit the accused. One common 
rationale for denying counsel was that, as to matters of fact, the accused 
was better informed than any counsel could be and tl}erefore he would 
be disadvantaged by counsel.24 A common, related, assertion was that 
the guiltless defendant who was first confronted directly by his accusers 
at trial and forced to respond spontaneously was put in a better 
position to reveal his earnest claims of innocence before the jury. 25 The 
common law courts also asserted that the defendant did not require 
counsel since the burden was placed upon the Crown to prove its 
charges and, once proven, it was futile for the defendant to deny 
them.26 This was claimed despite the fact that, as Langbein has demon-
strated, the entire system of trial .and pretrial procedures inaugurated 
during the reign of Queen Mary (1553-58) was stacked heavily and 
presumptively in favor of the Crown.27 But perhaps the most bold and 
self-satisfied rationale of the common law courts for denying counsel 
was that the unrepresented accused was in fact better protected by the 
court itself acting in its guardian of law capacity. "This rule may appear 
somewhat strict and severe, as the crown has always the benefit of 
counsel to marshal its evidence, and state the case to the jury; but is, in 
some degree, attempted to be explained by the maxim, that the judge is 
to be counsel for the prisoner."28 It is not difficult to surmise, given the 
tilt of the early scales of justice, that the court-as-counsel was hardly 
likely to be effective: 
This supposedly neutral pos1tion of the judge furnished an 
excuse, however, for continuing the practice of denying coun-
23. Id. at 35. 
24. Id. at 33. 
25. "[T]he Simplicity and Innocence, artless and ingenuous Behavior of one whose con-
science acquits him, ha[s] something in it more moving and convincing than the highest 
Eloquence of Persons speaking in a Cause not their own." HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 400. 
26. "[T]he proof belongs to [the crown] to make out these intrigues of yours; therefore you 
need not have counsel, because the proof must be plain upon you, and then it will be in vain to 
deny the conclusion." R. v. Edward Coleman, (1678) 7 ST. TR. 1, 14 (K.B.), cited in 1 JAMES 
FITzJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGlAND 382 (London, MacMillan 1883). 
27. LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 40. 
28. J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 407 (2d ed., London, A.J. Valpy 
1816). 
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sel in felonies, and the reason commonly given was that the 
judge was impartial and looked with equal suspicion on both 
sides in a !=riminal action, with the further explanation that a 
criminal proceeding was so simple that any man could under-
stand what was being done. Another reason, though certainly 
not stated openly at the time, was the view that the de'fendant, 
having been indicted as an enemy of the king, was at least half 
guilty and that all aids should be furnished to the king, whose 
security, at any rate during the seventeenth century, was more 
important than that of the individual accused. 29 
The restriction on counsel in the early common law era was not 
based upon a lack of or a general aversion to lawyers. 30 Already during 
this early period a class existed of lawyers who were fully representing 
clients in civil proceedings. Lawyers were also permitted to fully repre-
sent defendants charged with misdemeanors. The oddity of permitting 
counsel in minor offenses but prohibiting counsel for serious crimes is 
best explained by the more categorical separation between misdemean-
ors and felonies at early common law. 31 Virtually all felonies were 
capital offenses while virtually all misdemeanors were punished with 
only a fine. Misdemeanors were viewed more as civil offenses and not, 
as with felonies, as a breach of the king's peace. When the felony 
defendant attempted to refute the charges, he was effectively challeng-
ing an accusation made in the name of the- sovereign, hence the strict 
limitation imposed on his ability to effectively impugn those charges. 
The real designs of the early common law regarding the presence of 
counsel were broadly, and ironically, revealed during a period when 
the prohibition of counsel was temporarily replaced with the require-
ment of counsel. This occurred during the era of the notorious Star 
29. BEANEY, supra note 7, at 11. 
30. "During the era between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries a number of legal 
institutions undeiwent changes that paved the way for the adversarial procedure. Lawyers rose to 
prominence both as advocates and as judicial officers. At around the beginning of the 1300s 
requirements were established regulating the education and conduct of those who would be 
allowed to argue cases in the King's courts .... These .men formed the nucleus of a legal 
profession that would eventually assert exclusive control over the judicial machinery." Stephen 
Landsman, A Brief Suroey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 Omo ST. LJ. 713, 724-25 
(1983). 
31. "Illogically, in the least serious cases, English law had granted recognition of the 
accused's right to retain counsel and to make a defense with his assistance. In these minor cases 
... the state's interest was apparently deemed so slight that it could afford to be considerate 
toward defendants." BEANEY, supra note 7, at 8. 
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Chamber, which lasted for almost two hundred years until it was 
abolished by the Long Parliament in 1641. The Star Chamber was a sui 
generis tribunal that evolved out of the King's Council to become a 
major instrument of the monarchy to prosecute seditious libel, treason 
and other forms of religious or political dissidence. It is most com-
monly recalled in the modern era for its political treachery and its 
secret, highly inquisitorial means of establishing guilt. What is not 
commonly recalled, however, is its role in temporarily casting a false 
glow on the early practice of self-representation. The Star Chamber 
required every defendant to be represented by counsel who was willing 
to vouch for the defendant's intended defense. By the Seventeenth 
Century lawyers had become so deeply implicated in the treachery of 
Star Chamber that the ability to escape representation by this politically 
compromised caste of esquires had become a quest in its own right: 
[B ]y the practice of the Star Chamber defendants were not only 
allowed counsel, but were required to get their answers signed 
by counsel. The effect of this rule, and probably its object was, 
that no defence could be put before the Court which counsel 
would not take the responsibility of signing-a responsibility 
which, at that time, was extremely serious. If counsel would not 
sign the defendant's answer he was taken to have confessed the 
information. 32 
The Supreme Court in Faretta acknowledged these anomalous prac-
tices of the Star Chamber, but then also cited the abolition of that court 
as an affirmative embrace of the common law for the seemingly liberal 
individualism of self-representation: "The Star Chamber was swept 
away in 1641 by the revolutionary fervor of the Long Parliament. The 
notion of obligatory counsel disappeared with it. By the common law of 
that time, it was not representation by counsel but self-representation 
that was the practice in prosecutions for serious crime."33 However, the 
Court overstated, if not misstated, the real significance of the abolition 
of the Star Chamber. The prolonged struggle of the early era of the 
common law was to gain a new right to be represented by counsel in 
service to the accused, not to "gain" a right of self-representation. The 
independent demand for recognition of a right to counsel of the 
defendant's choosing continued throughout the reign of the Star 
32. STEPHEN, supra note 26, at 341. 
33. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823 ( 1975). 
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Chamber.34 The abolition of the Star Chamber simply returned that 
limited segment of the accused population to the punitive no-counsel 
posture of those prosecuted in the common law courts. The objection 
to the practice of the Star Chamber was not to the presence of counsel 
per se but rather to the obligation to be represented by counsel 
effectively in service to the crown. The abolition of the Star Chamber . 
did not represent a resurgence of support for the entitlement of 
self-representation. It instead represented the rejection of a punishing 
imposition that was worse than no counsel at all. Self-representation at 
early common law was always a default stemming from the denial of 
counsel, not a libertarian aspiration of the accused. 
B. The First Era of R.eform 
The breakthrough moment for the advance of a right to counsel 
occurred near the end of the Seventeenth Century. A notorious series 
of prosecutions for treason among political and religious dissidents 
preceded the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The treason trials presented 
a high-profile scandal of proceedings marked by the repeated spectacle 
of an innocent and uncounseled defendant with no fair opportunity to 
defend against a .politically interested court and crown counsel. The 
Treason Trials Act of 1696 was designed to provide relief only to this 
otherwise privileged class of political defendants by providing them 
with a right to hire and be represented by counsel.35 Even then, the 
common law courts maintained a restriction on treason counsel by 
preventing them from arguing the case directly to the jury. This 
limitation was designed to maintain the pressure of the common law 
for the accused to appear personally and vocally before the jury. The 
Act was nonetheless a small but first crack in the common law wall 
against trial counsel and it set in motion the long movement towards a 
general right of counsel in all criminal cases. 
Langbein describes this limited introduction of defense counsel as 
the tipping point that marked the critical transition to the modern 
adversary trial with its roster of attendant rights-all of which are 
predicated upon the existence of counsel. 36 Beginning in the second 
34. See, e.g., LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 11 n.2, for citations to the contemporaneous 
complaints. 
35. "The new mode of proceeding was introduced to seive wealthy grandees accused of 
treasonable intrigues (mostly offenses touching dynastic succession or religious establishment)." 
Id. at 3. 
36. "Adversary criminal trial traces to the 1696 Act." Id. at 68. 
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quarter of the Eighteenth Century, the English courts, without en-
abling legislation, exercised their supervisdry powers to extend the new 
right of counsel to felonies other than treason. This was a simple yet 
dramatic paradigm shift in trial practice. The defendant was no longer 
obliged to appear and answer personally at the outset and throughout 
the trial. 37 Increasingly, the defendant was permitted to defend through 
counsel and to remain personally silent at trial.38 
This provided the template for the emergence of a genuinely two-
sided, adversarial trial. The prosecution was required to make its case 
without the benefit of the participation of the accused, which in turn 
led to the development of a substantial one-sided burden of proof on 
the prosecution.39 This in turn promoted the development of a body of 
evidence law, particularly that of hearsay, which operated to exclude a 
good deal of prosecution evidence that would have typically emerged 
during the "bickering" process of the self-represented trial. This is also 
when evidence law developed its more profound commitment to 
confrontation and cross-examination as the primary tools of truth in 
the evidentiary process. This evolution of a highly adversarial, process-
driven jury trial practice unfolded slowly over the Eighteenth and into 
the Nineteenth Century in England. These same developments oc-
curred more rapidly, and formatively, in the colonies. 
C. The ColOnial Era 
The colonists immediately set out to forge a revolutionary response 
to the perceived injustices of Crown prosecutions. It is certainly true 
that lawyers in the colonies were hardly an exalted cadre of compatri-
ots. The colonists commonly viewed lawyers as having both class and 
political biases that rendered them obnoxious. But this hardly was 
evidence of a preference by the colonists for self- as opposed to 
lawyer-representation. Indeed, although the historical record of the 
colonial practice is unclear, it is at least evident, as the Supreme Court 
itself has recognized,40 that the colonists took strong exception to the 
English rule prohibiting counsel in criminal cases and almost immedi-
37. "[S]ecuring the accused as an informational resource was the central pre-occupation of 
the early modern trial." Id. at 61. 
38. "Only when defense counsel succeeded in restructuring the criminal trial to make it 
possible to defend a silent accused did a workable privilege against self-incrimination within 
common law trial procedure become possible." Id. at 278-79. 
39. Id. at 261. 
40. "The [English] rule was rejected by the colonies." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 
(1932). 
932 [Vol. 40 
SELF-REPRESENTATION 
ately began to repudiate that practice.41 
The objection in the colonies was not to lawyers per se but to lawyers 
who failed to represent the interests of the accused.42 The common 
practice of self-representation in the colonies was dictated not so much 
by normative preference as by the fact that there was as yet no readily 
available alternative.43 As might be expected, the colonial reaction to 
the ban on defense counsel was, if anything, more fervent than the 
mounting opposition to the rule in England.44 Self-representation in 
the colonial era was, for most defendants, borne of necessity rather 
than insistence. 
Throughout the colonial era rules regarding representation of the 
accused typically referred to a right to be represented either by self or by 
counsel.45 But the context in which these rules were adopted is critical 
to understanding their relative status. The transformative initiative 
represented by this development was clearly the recognition by the 
colonists of a nascent right to counsel. Although they were typically 
framed as procedural rights of an alternative character, they were not 
normative rights of the same order. There is no evidence that colonists 
insisted upon self-representation where counsel was otherwise avail-
able. Indeed, there was no need to champion a right for something that 
had long existed, both at home and in England, as the default practice 
of a system that had manifestly disadvantaged the accused. 
The Supreme Court in Faretta was nonetheless at pains to conclude 
41. "We have never admitted that cruel and illiberal principle of the common law of 
England, that when a man is on trial for his life, he shall be refused counsel, and denied those 
means of defence, which are allowed when the most trifling pittance of property is in question. 
The flimsy pretence, that the court are to be counsel for the prisoner will only heighten out 
indignation at the practice: for it is apparent to the least consideration, that a court can never 
furnish a person accused of a crime with the advice, and assistance necessary to make his 
defence ... " 2 ZEPHANIAH SWIFr, A SYsTI:M OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 398-99 
(Windham, 1796), cited in Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 828 n.35 (1975). 
42. "[A] t the time of the War of the Revolution, in each of the American Colonies a Bar had 
developed, composed of trained and able lawyers. The old antipathies towards the 'attorneys,' 
against whom so much legislation had been directed, in the earlier years had died away, for the 
character and talents of the men who undertook the practice of the profession had so distinctly 
changed." CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 211 (1911). 
43. "It is probably true that the English [no-counsel] rule combined with the early shortage 
oflawyers in the colonies made it inevitable that an accused should defend himself in most cases." 
BEANEY, supra note 7, at 18. 
44. "There does seem to have been a greater awareness in American courts that an accused 
who was undefended was at a serious disadvantage, and this awareness became keener as the 
number of lawyers increased in colonial America." Id. at 25. 
45. Farretta, 422 U.S. at 828. 
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that the colonists had in the Sixth Amendment conferred constitutional 
status jointly on both the right to counsel and the right to self-
representation. The problem of course was that while the Sixth Amend-
ment expressly includes a provision that "the accused ... shall have the 
assistance of counsel," it nowhere refers, either directly or by implica-
tion, to a coordinate right of self-representation. To complicate matters 
further, the Judiciary Act of 1789, which was signed into law by the First 
Congress just one day prior to the proposal of the Sixth Amendment, 
provided that "the parties may plead and manage their own causes 
personally or by the assistance of ... counsel."46 Conventional statutory 
analysis would suggest that, under these circumstances, the drafters 
intentionally excluded the right of self-representation from the Sixth 
Amendment.47 The Court therefore resorted to a "structural" analysis 
of the Amendment which found the dual privileges common to the 
Judiciary Act and the colonial era rules of representation to be implicit 
within the Amendment itself. 48 
But there is a more direct and simple explanation for the ra,ther 
glaring omission of any reference to self-representation in the Sixth 
Amendment: the drafters recognized the right to counsel as a fundamen-
tal and transformative feature of the new constitutional order, while 
the traditional practice of self-representation simply was not. There was 
no generally recognized right to government-appointed defense coun-
sel in the colonial era.49 Therefore, for the typical colonist who could 
not afford to hire a lawyer, representing himself was the only alterna-
tive. Thus, self-representation remained the default for those who 
chose, for whatever reason, not to avail themselves of the new right to 
hire a lawyer. The express reference to self-representation in the 
Judiciary Act and the glaring omission of any such reference in the 
46. Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92. 
47. "[I)t is a general principle of statutory construction that when Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion." Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
48. "Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-
representation-to make one's own defense personally-is thus necessarily implied by the 
structure of the Amendment." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819. 
49. "[W] e have as yet no proof that the actual judicial practice in many of the colonies was 
more liberal than the English practice. Also, it is evident that no uniform practice existed 
throughout the colonies at any time before, or soon after, the Revolution. Where provision was 
made for the appointment of counsel, it was done in most states only for capital offenses." BEANEY, 
supra note 7, at 21. 
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Amendment, at the same historical moment, underscores the likeli-
hood that the omission was purposeful rather than inadvertent.50 The 
drafters appear to have made a clear distinction between rights deemed 
to be of a fundamental, constitutional nature and those procedural 
rights, which were privileges of a lesser order. 
D. The Modern Era: A New Paradig;m Emerges 
The remnants of the English rule prohibiting defense counsel did 
not survive the founding of the Union.- The new federal government, 
and each of the states as they joined the Union, recognized a right to 
counsel in either a constitution or a statute or both.51 But apart from 
capital cases,52 the guaranteed right to assigned counsel evolved slowly 
over the next century and a half.53 And even where provision was made 
by statute or court rule for the assignment of counsel in non-capital 
cases, the actual assignment of an attorney was widely neglected in 
practice.54 Thus, until well into the Twentieth Century, it was not 
uncommon throughout the states for a defendant to answer a criminal 
charge, including a capital offense, without the assistance of counsel. 
But the Twentieth Century marked the gradual emergence of crimi-
nal law enforcement at the federal level and with it a national resettling 
of the essential norms of criminal justice. Central to this was a mount-
ing recognition of the paramount significance of the right to counsel to 
all the other rights deemed essential to criminal due process. Powell v. 
Alabama,55 the infamous "Scottsboro boys" case decided in 1932, was 
50. The Supreme Court was indeed tilting against several of the more standard protocols of 
statutory interpretation with regard to the relationship of the Sixth Amendment and the Judiciary 
Act.The Court "assumes that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation." Miles v. 
Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990). Furthermore, "it is a general principle of statutory 
. construction that when Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits 
it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 452. Chief Justice Burger 
made the point in his dissent in Faretta: "[U] nder traditional canons of construction, inclusion of 
the right in the Judiciary Act and its omission from the constitutional amendment drafted at the 
same time by many of the same men, support$ the conclusion that the omission was intentional." 
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 844 (Burger,]., dissenting). 
51. BEANEY, supra note 7, at 25. 
52. Id. at 138. 
53. Id. at 21. 
54. Id. at 138. 
55. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The facts of Puwellare as follows: Separate groups of black and white 
youths were riding a freight train across Alabama. The two groups got into a fight, following which 
all but one of the white youths were thrown off the train. Two white girls remained on the train. 
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the seminal and enduring event. On the morning of their trial, two 
attorneys had appeared before the trial judge and offered to "assist" at 
the trials but the Supreme Court subsequently found that the defen-
dants "were not accorded the right to counsel in any substantial 
sense."56 
The Supreme Court had never before held that the federal constitu-
tion required the state appointment of counsel for the accused in any 
case. But the Court so held in Powell and thereby initiated recognition 
of a new normative paradigm for the role of counsel in the modern 
practice of criminal jury trial. The Court posed the question as to what 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required as a 
minimal, fundamental guarantee for any defendant heard to answer in 
"a case such as this"57 and answered in a passage by Justice Sutherland 
that has resonated in the right to counsel cases ever since: 
What, then, does a hearing include? Historically and in prac-
tice, in our own country at least, it has always included the right 
to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party 
asserting the right. The right to be heard would be, in many 
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be 
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has 
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged 
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for 
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar 
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he 
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted 
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue 
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a 
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every 
step in the proceedings against him.58 
Shortly thereafter, the train was met and seven black youths were arrested and charged with the 
capital offense of rape. An Alabama statute required the appoinunent of counsel in capital cases. 
At their arraignment, the judge appointed "all members of the bar" to serve as counsel to the 
accused, yet no counsel actually appeared on their behalf. One week later, they were put to trial. 
The seven defendants were tried in three separate groups and all three trials were completed in 
one day. All seven defendants were convicted and sentenced to death. 
56. Id. at 58. 
57. Id. at 72. 
58. Id. at 68-69. 
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Powell was quickly followed by another extension of the right to 
assigned counsel. In Johnson v. 'Zerbst,59 the defendants were tried in 
federal court for a non-capital offense and were denied appointed 
counsel. The Court reiterated its analysis in Powell and concluded that, 
at least regarding all federal prosecutions, the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel guaranteed the assignment of counsel to all defendants, 
regardless of the nature of the charge.60 
The Court reversed direction four years later in Betts v. Brady.61 The 
defendant was tried and convicted for robbery in state court. He had 
pleaded indigency before the trial court but was denied appointed 
counsel because in Maryland counsel was appointed only in cases of 
murder and rape. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the 
Sixth Amendment rule of Johnson automatically requiring appointed 
counsel in all federal cases was to be incorporated within the Four-
teenth Amendment rule of Powell and thereby made applicable to all 
defendants in state court under the Fourteenth Amendment incorpora-
tion doctrine set forth in Powell. The Court acknowledged that" [ e] xpres-
sions in the opinions of this court lend color to the argument"62 but 
refused to so extend the doctrine of appointed counsel. Nevertheless, 
the right to counsel continued to expand for the next twenty years, 
albeit on a case-by-case due process basis. 
But the slowly evolving due process era came to an end in the early 
1960s with the advent of the Warren Court's "selective incorporation" 
doctrine. In a series of cases over less than a decade, the Court 
constructed a new national template for criminal justice by incorporat-
ing virtually every provision of the federal Bill of Rights into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One of the first of those 
incorporation cases was Gideon v. Wainwright,63 a Florida state case with 
59. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
60. "The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional 
safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.' It embodies a realistic recognition of 
the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect 
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the 
prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly, and 
necessary to the lawyer-to the untrained layman-may appear intricate, complex, and mysteri-
ous." Id. at 462-63. 
61. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
62. Id. at 462-63. 
63. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). James Earl Gideon was charged with a non-capital offense and 
requested the appointment of counsel. The trial court denied his request and Gideon was forced 
to represent himself at trial. He was convicted; his state court appeal was denied; and, still 
representing himself, he filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. The high court 
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facts similar to those in Betts., The Court held that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel was so incorporated and therefore applicable to 
all defendants otherwise denied counsel in state court proceedings. 
American justice would no longer permit an accused to be forced to 
represent himself against the state's modem prosecutorial arsenal.64 
Gideon affirmed that the "guiding hand" of professional defense 
counsel was essential to the fairness of virtually any criminal prosecu-
tion, refuting the self-representation mythology of a David taking on a 
Goliath. The structural significance of counsel to the modem adver-
sarial contest has been repeatedly reinforced: 
The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistanc~ of 
counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is 
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just 
results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, 
whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to 
ensure that the trial is fair. 65 
Their presence is essential because they are the means through 
which the other rights of the person on trial are secured. 
Without counsel, the right to a trial itself would be "of little 
avail," as this Court has recognized repeatedly.66 
This right, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, is indispensable to the fair administration of our adver-
sary system of criminaljustice.67 
appointed counsel to Gideon for purposes of his review in that court and subsequently decided 
that Betts had been wrongly decided. 
64. "Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in 
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an 
obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to 
establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere 
deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few 
defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to 
prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants 
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the wide-spread belief 
that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to 
counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in 
ours." Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
65. S~ckland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
66. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1984). 
67. Brewerv. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). 
938 [Vol. 40 
SELF-REPRESENTATION 
Without the help of a lawyer, all the other safeguards of a fair 
trial maybe empty.68 
From humble historical origins in England and relatively mod-
est beginnings in the country, the right to counsel has devel-
oped into the most vital of all the protections guaranteed to 
criminal defendants by the United States Constitution.69 
The central point cannot be ignored: the deliberately amateurish 
common law jury trial system has now evolved into a complex constitu-
tional system of interdependent rights. This new paradigm is premised 
on the assumption that counsel will always be available to the accused 
to navigate this new constitutional labyrinth. The new system of rights is 
now constructed as a house of cards that crumbles when counsel is 
removed. The mere right to have counsel is no longer sufficient; the 
actual presence of counsel is essential. The set points of default 
performance have been raised and regularized for all participants in 
the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of crime. The presence 
of defense counsel is essential not only to the interests of the accused, 
but also to the interests and integrity of the criminal justice system. The 
outcome of Gideon underscores the ultimate point: on retrial where he 
was represented by counsel, James Earl Gideon was found not guilty.70 
The right to appointed defense counsel now permeates the modern 
system of constitutional criminal justice in many ways. One example is 
the creation of the "Miranda rights" by the Warren Court in Miranda v. 
Arizona.71 Previously, the accused had no constitutional right to an 
attorney outside the courthouse, most notably at the station house. In 
Miranda, without even relying on the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court held that the accused possesses a right to have counsel present at 
the police station. The Court held that a person in custody at the 
station house and subject to interrogation by the police had a Fifth 
Amendment right to be protected against compelled self-incrimina-
tion. The only reasonable manner in which that right to remain silent 
could be protected, the Court reasoned, was by recognizing an inte-
grated right to have counsel appointed to represent the accused at the 
station house. 
It is therefore incongruous that only after the right to counsel had 
68. William]. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 773 (1961). 
69. JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT To THE AssISfANCE OF COUNSEL 45 (2002). 
70. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 237 (1964). 
71. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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been secured did the Supreme Court decide that the accused had an 
absolute right to reject the assistance of counsel at the courthouse. "It is 
thus no exaggeration to say that Faretta not only 'cut against the grain' 
of the Court's previous Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, but also 
undermined foundational principles of modern American criminal 
procedure."72 
E. Faretta 
The Supreme Court in Faretta held that all defendants have a 
co-equal Sixth Amendment right either to be represented by counsel 
or to self-represent. It reversed a California Supreme Court case which 
ruled that a right of self-representation was inconsistent with the 
modern, guiding-hand paradigm of criminal justice developed by the 
Supreme Court. The Faretta Court relied primarily upon a misreading 
of the foregoing history of the practice but also offered additional 
support grounded in the libertarian concept of individual "free choice" 
or "autonomy." But neither the historical nor the philosophical ration-
ales proffered by the Court are able to withstand analysis. 
It was no accident that the case arose in California. A long series of 
negative experiences with self-represented defendants in that state had 
led both the legislature and the state judiciary to review whether 
California should continue in the post-Gideon era to recognize a right of 
self-representation.73 Both the state constitution and statutes provided 
for the right. 74 The judiciary acted first, prior to the enactment of 
several changes to state constitutional and procedural law. In the 1972 
case of Peop!,e v. Sharp, 75 the trial court prevented the defendant from 
·firing his attorney on the day of trial and appearing pro se. The 
California Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The court held that 
"there is no express language in any of [the Sixth Amendment's] 
provisions which reasonably supports a right of prose representation. "76 
After a lengthy and strained review of state law, the court concluded 
that "neither the federal nor the California Constitution makes specific 
·provision for self-repre.sentation as a constitutionally protected right in 
72. RobertE. Toone, ThelncoherenceoJDefendantAutonomy, 83 N.C. L. REv. 621, 650 (2005). 
73. See generally Mark S. Dodson, Constitutional Law: The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972, 
61 CAL. L. REv. 377 (1973). 
74. Both the California Constitution and the Penal Code provide that a defendant had the 
right "to appear and defend in person and with counsel." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13; CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 686 (West 2008). 
75. 499 P.2d 489 (1972). 
76. Id. at 494. 
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criminal trials."77 The court relied heavily on a policy analysis which 
further reasoned that "social and judicial changes which have taken 
place during the almost 200 years require greater rather than lesser 
limitations on the right of self-representation. "78 
The California legislature was likewise undertaking broad measures 
to negate any right to self-representation. In 1971 the California Senate 
proposed a constitutional amendment to be submitted to the elector-
ate that would remove the reference to a right "to appear and defend in 
person" and add a provision that would grant the legislature the power 
to require counsel in a felony case.79 The legislature also passed a series 
of statutory amendments, to go into effect only upon passage of the 
constitutional amendment, which would require counsel in all capital 
cases.80 The sponsors of the changes argued that the right to self-
representation had become an empty and dysfunctional entitlement in 
contemporary criminal trials: 
This change in our Constitution, and the legislation which _it 
authorizes, is necessary in order to ensure the defendant is 
fairly advised of his rights during the trial, and at the same time 
reduce the delays, reversals, and courtroom disruptions which 
occur when an untrained person attempts to be his own lawyer 
... Today's complex legal system leaves no room for the person 
unschooled in law and criminal procedure . . . Not only is 
self-representation harmful to the defendant, but it can work 
havoc upon the judicial process.81 
The electorate passed the constitutional amendment the following 
year, making California the first state to reject and remove any refer-
ence in state law to a right to self-representation. It was to be a 
short-lived moment in the vanguard. Shortly after the new laws went 
into effect, Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft, a non-capital 
offense. Faretta requested to proceed pro se. The trial court initially 
granted his request but then reversed itself and ordered him to 
proceed to trial with counsel. The only reason Faretta provided for 
wanting to dismiss his attorney was that he believed th~ public defend-
77. Id. at 496. 
78. Id. at 494. 
79. S. Res. ch. 240 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1971). 
80. S. Res. ch. 1800 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1971). 
81. Propositions and Proposed Laws, Together with Arguments, Primary Election, Tuesday, 
June 6, 1972, at 8, available at http:/ /holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1972p.pdf. 
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er's office was "very loaded down with ... a heavy case load."82 Faretta 
was convicted; the intermediate appellate court affirmed in an unre-
ported opinion; the California Supreme Court denied review; and the 
Supreme Court granted review by certiorari.83 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, held that 
Faretta had been denied his right to self-representation guaranteed by 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Faretta took the opposite 
approach of the California court in Sharp to the traditional references 
in both federal and state law that coupled a right to counsel with a right 
to represent oneself. The Sharp court addressed a state constitution 
that expressly referred to a right to "defend in person," yet the court's 
interpretation led it to rule that the text did not actually confer an 
absolute right to self-representation. Conversely, the Faretta Court 
construed the federal Constitution~ which makes no express reference 
to self-representation, to read such a right into the Sixth Amendment. 
Neither opinion is particularly compelling. 
The Faretta court had a choice. No prior case had held that the Sixth 
Amendment guaranteed a right to self-representation. The most straight-
forward choice for the Court would have been to recognize that the 
framers had gotten it right: the right to self-representation was a default 
procedural right protected by federal statute but it was not a fundamen-
tal, constitutional right within the text or context of the Sixth Amend-
ment. This approach would have upheld the California initiative as a 
product of the Powell-Gideon right-to-counsel case line. It would have 
permitted the states to review their own commitment to a right to 
self-representation in an era when the Supreme Court had already 
ruled, contrary to both the text and associated practice of the federal 
constitution and statutes, that the demands of the modern adversarial 
trial require that the states assign counsel to all defendants in all serious 
cases.84 The same historical analysis of the evolving demands of the 
adversarial trial system that led to the requirement that the states 
ensure counsel in all circumstances demonstrates the folly of self-
represen tation in virtually all circumstances.85 The Court could have 
82. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). 
83. People v. Faretta, 415 U.S. 975 (1974). 
84. This claim for individual state "autonomy" was directly presented to and rejected by the 
Supreme Court in an amicus brief. See Brief of Ohio and 18 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner, Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208). 
85. "The notion that criminal defense was a suitable do-it-yourself activity developed at a time 
when the whole of the criminal trial was expected to transpire as a lawyer-free contest of 
amateurs." LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 11. 
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used Faretta to reinforce the preeminent command of Gideon to require 
all states to provide all defendants with access to a defense bar that is 
capable of effective representation. 
However, the Faretta court opted for another choice which appeared 
to assume that the due process-incorporation movement required strict 
guardianship by the Supreme Court of any right that might reasonably 
be attributed to the framers. A right of self-representation, while 
fundamentally at odds with the Gideon court's recognition of the need 
for a defense counsel's "guiding hand," was such a right. Furthermore, 
the practice of self-representation had up to that point generated 
virtually no concern or controversy within the federal system, thereby 
giving it the appearance of a relatively inconsequential burden to 
impose upon the states.86 
The Court relied almost entirely upon the "nearly universal convic-
tion"87 for such a right found in the original, and unmodified, statutes 
and state constitutions which consistently paired a right to counsel with 
a right to represent oneself. The opinion treated the two rights as being 
joined as equals and made no attempt to analyze their normative status 
independently. The Court grounded this co-equal treatment upon an 
historical analysis that was, as described above, misleading with regard 
to the purported "fervent insistence" of the colonists upon an indepen-
dent right to self-representation. Yet the Court relied upon this analysis 
to conclude that the right, although not included on the express list of 
rights of the accused in the Sixth Amendment, was nonetheless "neces-
sarily implied"88 in that amendment. 
It is one thing to find an implied right in the Constitution located 
either within an expanded reading of the text itself89 or within the 
interstitial penumbras of the various textual provisions.90 But it is more 
troublesome to find an implied right when the opposite counterpart to 
that putative right is exclusively specified within the text. The Supreme 
Court had earlier confronted this circumstance with regard to another 
86. "Presumably the occasions are rare when a defendant will plead ncit guilty and then waive 
counsel. The paucity of cases where a defendant has done so suggests that since the case of 
Johnson v. Zerbst [304 U.S. 458 (1938)] defendants will accept the appointment of counsel." 
BEANEY, supra note 7, at 59. 
87. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817. 
88. /d.at819. 
89. SeeMcMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("[T]he right to counsel is the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel"). 
90. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 ( 1965) (recognizing a right of association 
within the penumbra of the First Amendment, despite that "[t]he association of people is not 
mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights."). 
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proVIs1on of the Sixth Amendment: the right to be tried "by an 
impartialjury."91 In Singerv. United States,92 the defendant had claimed 
the right to be tried without a jury following his knowing and voluntary 
waiver of his right to be tried by jury. The Court denied his claim and 
recognized that the waiver of a right is not itself a right. It is a privilege 
that may or may not be granted depending upon particularized crite-
ria. 93 The Faretta Court dismissed this juxtaposition of right-versus-
privilege in a footnote, noting only that the Singer Court had recog-
nized "that an implied right must arise independently from the design 
and history of the constitutional text."94 
Three justices joined in two vigorous dissents95 which appeared to 
prompt a number of concessions in the opinion for the Court. Justice 
Stewart acknowledged at the outset that the case presented "not an easy 
question"96 and later confronted the nearly universal conviction in the 
Court's then-recent case law that the guiding hand of counsel is 
essential to a fair trial: 
There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to 
conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this 
Court's decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no. 
accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been 
accorded the right to the assistance of counsel. [citing cases] 
For it is surely true that the basic thesis of those decisions is that 
the help of a lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair 
trial. And a strong argument can surely be made that the whole 
thrust of those decisions must inevitably lead to the conclusion 
91. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
92. 380 U.S. 24 (1965). 
93. A similar circumstance developed with regard to the criminal defendant's right to testify 
under oath at his own trial. Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, the common Jaw rule 
was that the defendant was incompetent to testify. The defendant was, however, commonly 
provided with a right to make an unsworn statement. But when the defendant did finally gain the 
right to testify, he did not retain a residual right to provide an unsworn statement. See Ferguson v. 
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
94. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 n.15 (1975). 
95. Justices Burger and Blackmun dissented separately. Each joined the other's dissent and 
each was joined by Justice Rehnquist.Justice Blackmun's dissent concluded with the memorable 
observation that "the Court by its opinion today now bestows a constitutional right on one to make 
a fool of himself." Id. at 852 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). 
96. Id. at 807 (majority opinion). 
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that a State may constitutionally impose a lawyer upon even an 
unwilling defendant.97 
Strong, but apparently not strong enough. The Court then made a 
modest attempt to support its historically determined analysis with a 
policy analysis of the right to self-representation. The right was said to 
be grounded in the "inestimable worth of free choice"98 recognized by 
the Founders. After conceding that the right would actually benefit the 
accused only "in some rare instances"99 which the Court did not 
identify, the opinion maintained that the inestimable worth of the right 
required that the typical prose defendant be made to bear the conse-
quences of his foolish choice.100 In other words, the Court argued that 
the Constitution guarantees individuals the opportunity to cause prob-
able and unnecessary harm to themselves at trial and then forces them 
to abide the foolish consequences of their ill-advised decision. 
Faretta's almost complete reliance on its flawed historical analysis to 
determine the existence of a nght to self-representation allowed it to 
virtually ignore any need to provide a normative account in support of 
the right. The Court made only passing references to "that respect for 
the individual which is the lifeblood of the law" and "the inestimable 
worth of free choice." These bland rhetorical references would subse-
quently be interpreted by the Court as explaining ·that the right to 
self-representation "exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the 
accused."101 The philosophical principle of autonomy has become a 
powerful, if often ill-used, reference to support a broad array of 
restraints upon the state.102 
The modern concept of autonomy is a mercurial construct, difficult 
to isolate or pin down. It has become something of a catch-all refer-
ence, sometimes loosely applied, to identify a broad libertarian commit-
ment to permitting individuals to control those decisions that have a 
recognized (or at least arguable) normative value to the essential 
conditions of individual self-identity. But i_t is important to note that it is 
97. Id. at 832-33. 
98. Id. at 833-34. 
99. Id. at 834. 
100. Id. ("And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his 
choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.'") 
(quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan,]., concurring)). 
101. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984). 
102. "As autonomy has played an increasingly important role in modern moral and political 
philosophy, so has it become central to the' Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence." 
Toone, supra note 72, at 651. 
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a normative concept that is itself normatively circumscribed. Autonomy 
as used in the modern legal context is not a radical libertarian concept 
that posits an existential freedom to be free from all state regulation or 
restriction over any choices/ decisions thought to have a bearing on 
self-identity. The choice at issue must itself obtain prior recognition as 
one that is legitimately inscribed with normative value. Autonomy itself 
does not inscribe all life choices with such normative value. The 
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged this limiting provision: "That 
many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause 
sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion 
that any and all important, intimate and personal decisions are so 
protected."103 
Examples of state control over intimate life choices are ubiquitous. 
No one in a modern society could reasonably raise the banner of 
autonomy to claim, for example, a right to self-operate in a public 
hospital. This is simply not recognized as a legitimate choice. The same 
is true in most jurisdictions with regard to the self-installation of an 
electric service panel by an unlicensed individual in his own home. The 
fact that it is only the handy homeowner who may be electrocuted in 
the process does not render it a legitimate choice implicating the norm 
of autonomy. Perhaps the most telling recent example of the distinc-
tion between the general norm of autonomy and the particular norma-
tive value of the choice at issue is expressed in the modern recognition 
of the legitimacy of same-sex intimacy. Broad notions of sexual or 
bodily autonomy have been used over the years to support a right to 
various forms of sexual activity. 104 But the principle of autonomous free 
choice had not been extended to same-sex intimacy until that very 
sexual activity itself was recently recogni:z;ed as a legitimate life choice in 
Lawrence v. Texas. 105 · 
The essential question regarding the Faretta reliance upon the prin-
ciple of autonomy is therefore: what are the fundamental, normative 
values associated with an individual's choice to represent himself at 
trial? Quite frankly, there are none. One searches in vain, in either the 
case law or the academic literature, to uncover any identification or 
103. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521US702, 727 (1997) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411U.S.1, 33-35 (1973)). 
104. The seminal case is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
105. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). For an excellent account of the evolving recognition of 
autonomy as applied to homosexual intimacy, see NICHOLAS C. BAMFORTII & DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, 
PATRIARCHAL RELIGION, SEXUALITY AND GENDER: A CRITIQUE OF NEW NATURAL LAW 211-27 (Cam-
bridge 2008). 
946 [Vol. 40 
SfilF-RFPRESENTA TION 
explication of the positive values associated with an individual having 
the freedom to pursue such a course. The Supreme Court's Sixth 
Amendment case law, beginning with the iconic passage by Justice 
Sutherland in Powell, 106 describes in detailed and compelling terms the 
values inherent in a right to counsel. Similar normative accounts have 
accompanied the touchstone cases regarding the recognition or expan-
sion of other rights of the accused. But neither Faretta nor the subse-
quent self-representation cases have ever provided a meaningful ac-
count of what is to be positively gained or secured by recognizing such a 
right, apart from vacuous references to the value of "free choice." 
Indeed, to the contrary, Faretta expressly recognizes the almost certain 
harmfulness and futility of recognizing a freedom to make such a 
choice. 
The concept of autonomy is contextual. It refers only to choices that 
are deemed legitimate at the time of their making. "The concept of 
autonomy has come to play a vibrant and resilient role in the Court's 
greater constitutional jurisprudence, but as used in Faretta and its 
progeny, it is an illusion."107 And, as we shall see in Part IV, the 
recognition of such a right of autonomy in the structural context of a 
modern international court or tribunal is even more illusory. The 
vacuous, indeed suspect, rationale for recognizing self-representation 
as libertarian self-infliction is reminiscent of the early common law 
rationalizations for the no-counsel rule. 108 The irony and inadequacy 
of the Court's anachronistic analysis of the right was contained in its 
own pithy summary of its holding: "In short, the Amendment constitu-
tionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as 
we know it."109 This of course referred to what we knew about the 
making of a defense at trial as of 1975, forty-three years after Powell and 
thirteen years after Gideon. 
Ill. THE MANY 1-IARMFuL ERRORS OF FARETTA 
There is virtually nothing positive to report regarding the post-Faretta 
experience with self-representation. There have been n~ redeeming 
106. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932). 
107. Toone, supra note 72, at 655. 
108. "Thus, from the outset, the Court's announcement of the right of an accused to proceed 
pro se in a criminal proceeding was not free from skepticism about its legal foundation, moral 
legitimacy and practical consequences." John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself 
in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Seif-Representation Twenty Yean- after Faretta, 6 SETON HALL 
CoNsr. LJ. 483, 496 (1996). 
109. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). 
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stories of the triumph of a simple, old-fashioned justice; no realizations 
of any strategic benefit or advantage to a particularized set of defen-
dants; no recognition of self-representation providing a check or 
restraint on the modem machinery of prosecution; no engaging or 
edifying political encounters between the individual accused and his 
state accusers; no reassuring expressions of pride in a system so 
versatile and accommodating that it can ensure just results even when 
challenged by a diverse cohort of individualistic contrarians; basically, 
no gains in any quarter. 
The Supreme Court callously rationalized the unlikely benefits of . 
recognizing a right of self-representation by positing that it was the 
defendant himself, the bearer of the right, who would bear the harmful 
consequences of its invocation. The Court's caveat emptor philosophy 
would excuse the state for the almost certain and substantial costs to be 
imposed on the defendant. no But Faretta has caused real harm that has 
been distributed on a broad and indiscriminate basis. It has presented 
the courts with a constitutional commandment so unforgiving that they 
have been forced to struggle endlessly, and fruitlessly, to contain the 
damage. This Part will briefly summarize the already well-documented 
doctrinal morass of Faretta and then focus more directly upon provid-
ing a broad portrait of the real and intolerable harms that arise from 
that legal abyss. It will do this by highlighting for each of the various 
harms one or two of the more prominent self-representation cases, all 
of which tend to speak their harm quite well for themselves. 
The Faretta Court was not unaware of the dangers its decision might 
cause; the dissenters provided a prescient list. 1u But the only danger 
the Court chose to address directly, albeit in a footnote, was the threat 
to the orderly proceeding of the trial itself. At the conclusion of a 
paragraph explaining how the principle of the autonomy, or "free 
choice," of the accused was supported by the fact that it was he who "will 
bear the personal consequences of a conviction,"u2 the Court entered 
a footnote to explain that certain consequences, to the court itself, would 
not be tolerated. The footnote recognized the possjbility of a pro se 
defendant engaging in "deliberate disruption" and authorized trial 
courts to appoint "standby" counsel who would stand in whenever the 
110. "The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of 
a conviction." Id. at 834. 
lll. Id. at 838-39 (Burger, J., dissenting) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 
(1932)). 
ll2. Id. at 834 (majority opinion). 
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trial proceeding was threatened. 113 The practice of appointing such 
standby counsel became almost immediately ubiquitous114 as well as an 
irresolvable morass.115 · 
Nothing better portrays the fundamental conflict between the prom-
ise of Gideon and the guarantee of Faretta than the utter failure of the 
American experience with standby counsel. The initial concept was 
abundantly hopeful. The standby attorney was to be "seen but not 
heard"116; a lawyer-in-waiting precluded from prepping the case but 
who could nonetheless step in mid-performance and take over the 
leading role without hitch or conflict; a passive, unassertive assistant to 
the commands of the defendant who had already refused her as an 
advocate and who retained the power of refusal over all the attorney's 
professional advice and services. But the inherent conflicts presented 
by standby counsel surfaced immediately in the case law. When the trial 
court appointed standby counsel over the defendant's objection, the 
defendant would claim a denial of his Faretta right to unfettered 
self-representation.117 When the court did not appoint standby coun-
sel, the defendant would claim an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court. 118 When standby counsel became active in the trial, typically at 
the request of the defendant, the defendant would later claim that 
counsel had become too active in violation of his Faretta right. 119 When 
standby counsel remained passive throughout the trial, the defendant 
would claim a denial of his right to standby assistance.120 When the 
defendant permitted some trial involvement of standby counsel, some 
courts treated this as a waiver of his Faretta right, 121 suggesting a 
113. Id. at 834 n.46. 
114. See THE BENCHBOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES, § 1.02 (4th ed. 1996) ("It is 
probably advisable to appoint.standby counsel .... "). 
115. See, e.g., Decker, supra n. 108; Ann Bowen Poulin, The Rnle of Stand/Jy Counsel in Criminal 
Cases: In the Twilight Zone of the Criminal justice System, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 676 (2000); Marie Higgins· 
Williams, The Pro se Criminal Defendant, Sta7:1d/Jy Counsel, and the judge: A Proposal for Better-Defined 
Rnles, 71 U. Cow. L. REV. 789 (2000) ;Joshua L. Howard, Hylnid Representation and Stand/Jy Counsel: 
Let's Clear the Air for the Attorneys of South Carolina, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 851 (2001). 
116. Wiggins v. Estelle, 681 F.2d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 1982), reu'd sub nom. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 
465 U.S. 168, 173 (1984). 
117. See, e.g., McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 173. 
118. See, e.g., United States v. LaChance, 817 F.2d 1491, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987); McQueen v. 
Blackbum, 755 F.2d 1174, 1176 (5th Cir. 1985); Locks v. Summer, 703 F.2d 403, 404 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
119. See, e.g., United States v. Dyman, 739 F.2d 762, 771 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Heine, 920 F.2d 552, 553 (8th Cir. 1990). 
120. See, e.g., Molino v. DuBois, 848 F. Supp. 11, 12 (D. Mass. 1994). 
121. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 588A.2d 305, 306 (Me. 1991). 
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bait-and-switch cynicism behind the practice. Twenty-five years later 
one scholar noted that " [ t] he role of standby counsel ... has never 
been clearly defined. An appointment as standby counsel casts an 
attorney into an uncomfortable twilight zone of the law."122 
The Supreme Court's sole foray into the minefields of standby 
counsel occurred in the 1984 case of McKaskl,e v. Wiggins. 123 The 
decision failed to provide order, or even direction, for trial courts 
confronted with the protean disorders of the typical pro se proceed-
ing. 124 In an extended yet remarkably irresolute opinion by Justice 
O'Connor the Court attempted to both reaffirm the high-mindedness 
of Faretta and likewise acknowledge the utter lack of profit in the cases: 
" [ t] he right to appear prose exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of 
the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at !,east occasion-
ally, be the accused's best possible defense." 125 The transparent cyni-
cism of McKaskl,e merely reflected, but did not alleviate, the rampant 
cynicism that had developed around an unmediated right that had 
produced nothing but wrong.126 
The most critical, and ultimately most harmful, doctrinal develop-
ment occurred with the Supreme Court's 1993 ruling in Godinez v. 
Moran.127 In Faretta, the Court had created a right that assumed that a 
non-lawyer charged with a crime was competent to assume the role of 
trial litigator as to matters of both fact and law. This assumption was 
proven false in the early self-representation cases. The principal ques-
tion that roiled the lower courts for almost twenty years was what 
minimal level of functional competence, if any, was required of a 
defendant who elected to proceed pro se. 128 The Godinez court declared 
that a prose defendant need only be sufficiently competent to proceed 
122. Poulin, supra note 115, at 676. 
123. 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
124. "Despite minimal guidance from the Supreme Court, appellate courts still struggle to 
reconcile the competing interests of the unskilled pro se defendant, who seeks to fully exploit his 
Faretta rights, with the interests of the trial court, seeking the orderly and efficient administration 
of justice." Decker, supra note 108, at 524-5. 
125. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176 (1984) (emphasis added). 
126. See, e.g., United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d. 245, 251 (6th Cir. 1987) (circuit court 
disposed of the appellant's fair trial claim with the observation that "(t)he only thing that was 
'unfair' about McDowell's trial was that he did not represent himself very well."). 
127. 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
128. "Godinez resolved two decades of a considerable disagreement among circuit courts." 
Decker, supra note 108, at 518-19. 
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to trial. 129 In other words, defendants who were actually mentally 
incompetent to represent themselves could be found legally competent 
to do so. The Court therefore upheld the conviction of a pro se 
defendant who had been indicted on three counts of capital murder. 
He was examined by several psychiatrists and found competent to stand 
trial. He then dismissed his assigned counsel in order "to prevent the 
presentation of mitigating evidence at his sentencing."130 He pleaded 
guilty and was sentenced to death. 
The Court's Orwellian holding presented the issue of election in 
inverse terms: the issue was not the competency to proceed pro se but 
the competency to waive the alternative. The single, all-purpose compe-
tency standard the Court relied upon derived from the 1960 two-
paragraph opinion in Dusky v. U.S.,131 a notoriously low standard. A 
defendant may be seriously mentally ill yet still be found competent to 
proceed to trial. Dusky's two-prorig, counsel-based standard requires 
. merely that the defendant have a "rational ... understanding of the 
proceedings" plus the ability "to consult with his lawyer with a reason-
able degree of rational understanding."132 Dusky's minimalist standard 
is itself premised upon the presumption that the marginal defendant 
will be represented by counsel. The Dusky standard thus fails of its own 
accord when a mentally suspect defendant is not represented by 
counsel. 
Godinez created an all-{)r-nothing conundrum for trial courts con-
fronted by a mentally troubled defendant who insists upon appearing 
prose. If the trial court believes that the defendant appearing before it is 
not competent to provide a plausible defense at trial, either the court 
has to find the defendant not competent to be tried at all or it has to 
permit him to self-represent. A defendant who self-represents is not 
required to, and typically does not, present a defense based upon his 
own mental shortcomings. Therefore a trial court that permits the 
mentally compromised defendant to self-represent realizes that the 
jury will not be presented with any exculpating or mitigating evidence 
of the defendant's mental state. "The right to self-representation, 
recognized in Faretta v. California, effectively endows mentally ill defen-
dants with the power to veto the decision to present evidence of their 
129. "[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel 
is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself." Godinez, 509 U.S. 
at 399. 
130. Id. at 392. 
131. 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
132. Id. at 402. 
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mental illness."133 
The Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards134 has recently attempted 
to step back from its unforgiving opinion in Godinez, which insisted 
upon a singular "unified theory" approach to competency. The Court 
did so in order to "alleviate those fair trial concerns"135 of the lower 
courts. Under Edwards, some defendants who suffer from "severe 
mental illness" yet are still Dusky-competent-loosely referred to in the 
opinion as "gray-area defendants"-may be denied the right to proceed 
pro se. 136 The State of Indiana had petitioned the Court to overrule 
Faretta in order to enable the "autonomy" of the states to maintain a 
criminal justice system committed to "actual justice" as well as to end 
the "romantic illusion that proceeding pro se may provide a better 
chance at a favorable result."137 Despite amicus briefs from eleven 
other states in support of Indiana's petition, 138 the Supreme Court 
"decline[d] to do so." The Court also upheld the holding in Godinez, 
meaning that a seriously mentally ill "gray-area" defendant is still 
deemed competent to waive counsel, plead guilty and be sentenced to 
death-without ever presenting a defense to the charges. While the 
opinion in Edwards provides the states with some escape from the rigid 
grasp of Faretta, it will also almost necessarily produce another nightmar-
ish struggle for the lower courts to conduct expert-driven "Edwardl', 
hearings" to determine who qualifies as a "gray-area" defendant and 
what measures will establish the minimal level of cognitive and perfor-
mative competency required of such mentally ill individuals in order to 
proceed pro se. 
The Faretta doctrine has proven eostly enough but it is the actual 
product, the cases themselves, that reveals the real and relentless harms 
of prose representation. 
133. Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: An Argument for Fairness 
and Against Self Representation in the Criminal justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 164 
(2000). 
134. 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008). 
135. Id. at 2388. 
136. The defendant in Edwards had been diagnosed with a severe mental illness that 
rendered him Dusky-incompetent for approximately six years before being found fit to proceed. 
Id. at 2385. 
137. Brieffor Petitioner at 60, Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208). 
138. Brief of Ohio, Alaska, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Indiana v. Edwards, 
128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208). 
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A. Harm to the Defendant 
Colin Ferguson shot and killed six passengers and wounded nine-
teen others on a Long Island Rail Road commuter train in December of 
1993. There was no apparent motive for the shootings. He pulled out a 
gun and began pacing up and down the aisle of the car, "firing 
methodically, reloading when he ran out of bullets,"139 until he was 
subdued by several of the other passengers. Ferguson, a black man, 
claimed "a mysterious 'white Caucasian' gunman committed the massa-
cre."140 Two lawyers who volunteered to represent him claimed that he 
was temporarily overcome as the victim of "black rage" in a racist 
society.141 The trial court held a competency hearing at which psychia-
trists testified that Ferguson suffered from a mental illness that ren-
dered him delusional and paranoid and caused him to react violently 
to his imagined persecutors.142 The court nonetheless found Ferguson 
competent to stand trial and therefore competent to represent him-
. self. 143 
Ferguson dismissed the two lawyers who had volunteered to repre-
sent him and proceeded to represent himself at trial. He presented a 
defense of misidentification despite the fact that fifteen witnesses 
identified him as the shooter on their train. He referred to himself in 
the third person before the jury and at times appeared in court wearing 
a bulletproof vest. In his opening statement to the jury he explained 
that he was charged with 93 counts in the indictment "only because it 
matches the year 1993."144 He also claimed that the CIA had planted a 
computer chip in his brain.145 Ferguson did not present any evidence 
of his mental condition. At the close of his rather bizarre trial, he spoke 
to the jury for several hours detailing the various conspiracies against 
him, after which the jury convicted him of six counts of murder and 
139. Paul Viti~llo, In a Different World, N.Y. NEWSDAY,jan. 27, 1995, atA05. 
140. Ronald L. Kuby & William M. Kuns tier, So Crazy He Thinks He Is Sane: The Colin Ferguson 
Trial and the Competency Standard, 5 CORNELLj.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 19, 20 (1995). 
141. Andrew Smith, DA Seeks Gag Order on Ferguson Lawyers, N .Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 2, 1994, at 11. 
142. John T. McQuiston, Ferguson's Insanity Defense Angers Victims and His Lawyers, N .Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 8, 1995, § 13, at 1. 
143. See People v. Ferguson, 670 N.Y.S. 2d 327, 328 (1998) (affirming finding of compe-
tency). 
144. Stanley S. Arkin & Katherine E. Hargrove, justice Mocked When Madman Defends Himself, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, at Ml. 
145. Larry McShane, Ferguson's Trial Antics May Set Stage for Appea~ Cm. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 19, 
1995, at 3. 
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nineteen counts of attempted murder. 146 The trial court, describing 
Ferguson as a "selfish, self-righteous coward," sentenced him to six 
consecutive life sentences.147 
One of the more remarkable American experiences with a pro se 
defendant concerned the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen 
residing in America, who was arrested in August of 2001, on immigra-
tion charges and remained in jail at the time of the World Trade Center 
bombing on September 11. In December of that year he was indicted 
on capital charges of being a member of the 9/11 conspiracy as the 
alleged "twentieth hijacker."148 Moussaoui proclaimed himself to be a 
member of Al Qaeda and a devoted follower of Osama Bin Laden but 
he denied that he was an actual member of the 9/11 conspiracy. 
Whether this was true or not, many believed that it would have been 
very difficult for the government to have proven its case at trial. 149 
Moussaoui was arraigned before District Court Judge Leonie 
Brinkema in the Eastern District of Virginia. She appointed a team of 
lawyers from the local Federal Public Defenders Office to represent 
Moussaoui. He refused to cooperate with these attorneys and in April 
2002, filed a motion to dismiss the attorneys and appear prose. Judge 
Brinkema found him competent and granted his motion. The judge 
simultaneously also appointed the same attorneys to serve as standby 
counsel despite the lead attorney's unanswerable query: "He believes 
I'm trying to kill him. Why would you require him to have anything at 
146. Ferguson, 670 N.Y.S. 2d at 327. 
147. "The result in the Ferguson case illustrates the unfortunate disgrace caused by the 
Supreme Court's holding in Faretta." Decker, supra note 108 at 523. See also Richard]. Bonnie, 
Ferguson Spectade Demeaned System, NAT'L. LJ., Mar. 13, 1995, at A23; George P. Fletcher, Colin 
Ferguson s Client is a Foo~ N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 20, 1994, atA32. 
148. The 9/11 conspiracy involved four hijacked airplanes, each of which was comman-
deered by five hijackers except for one of the planes which had only four hijackers. 
149. "Moussaoui was certainly connected to Al Qaeda, but his real value to the United States 
may have been as a witness and not as a stand-in for the dead hijackers, who are beyond 
punishment .... Moussaoui's arrest, one former CJ.A. official told me, 'was totally circumstantial. 
They cast a wide net and the guy happened to be a little fish who got caught up in it. They know it 
now. And nobody will back off,'" Seymour M. Hersh, The Twentieth Man: Has the Justice Department 
Mishandled the Case Against Zacarias Moussaoui?, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 2002, at 56. "Some U.S. 
officials remain doubtful about how much useful information Moussaoui has. One official familiar 
with the investigation said he doubted Moussaoui was involved in the planning for Sept. 11 
because he was 'a late addition' to the plot." Tom Jackman & Walter Pincus, U.S. Considers Talking 
toMoussaoui, WASH. Posr,July20, 2002, atA12. See also Jonathan Turley, TheCaseAgainstMoussaoui 
is Far From a Lead-Pipe Cinch, L.A. TiMEs, Dec. 30, 2001, at MS. 
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all to do with me?"150 Moussaoui then began a long series of vitriolic pro 
semotions151 and courtroom disruptions152 directed at both his standby 
counsel and the trial judge. In November 2003, Judge Brinkema 
revoked his right to self-represent and reappointed the standby counsel 
but Moussaoui continued to reject their representation and accused 
the judge and his appointed counsel of engaging in a conspiracy to 
cause his death. One of the more absurd conflicts this situation 
produced occurred when the government was required to disclose 
certain critical classified information to the defense. Since Moussaoui 
did not have a security clearance, he-the lawyer on the case-was not 
allowed to view it. Only his counsel, whether appointed or standby, was 
permitted to view the material, but Moussaoui consistently exercised 
his right to refuse to collaborate with them. 
In April, 2005, after several years of protracted conflict and without 
any cooperation or consideration, Moussaoui abruptly pleaded guilty 
to the capital indictment. A jury decided against imposing the death 
penalty. He was then sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole. The government case in this extraordinary prosecution was 
therefore never challenged or even revealed and Moussaoui himself 
terminated the proceedings without ever actually conceding that he 
was indeed the twentieth hijacker. Moussaoui's trial, the only prosecu-
tion of an alleged participant in the World Trade Center bombing, 
produced only an extended high-profile spectacle that made no contri-
bution to either the historical record or individual justice. 
To be sure, it is not unheard of for a prose defendant to plead guilty 
to a capital offense and even to be sentenced to death without interpos-
ing a challenge to the prosecution's case.153 This extraordinary break-
down of judicial responsibiliry is supported by the caveat emptor prin-
ciple of Faretta: the defendant must bear the full risk and burden of his 
freedom to choose. The Supreme Court made this clear in a case 
decided several years after Faretta. In Lenhard v. Wolff the defendant 
150. Eunice Moscoso, TerrurSuspect "Competent," ProsecuturSays, THEATIANTAJOURNAL-CONST., 
June 8, 2002, at lOA. 
151. Among the many pro se motions were the following: Motion by Moussaoui to Stop 
Undermining My Constitutional Right to Represent Myself, U.S. v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A, 
Docket No. 211 (E.D. Va.June 24, 2002), available at http:/ /notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/l:Ol-
cr--00455/DocketSheet2.html; Motion by Moussaoui To Prevent Standby Counsel from Sitting at 
Defense Table, id.; Motion to Stop Leonie Brinkema DJ Playing Game with My Life, id. 
152. See, e.g., Jerry Markon, judge Bars Moussaoui From Jury Selection: Interjections Again Prompt 
CourtRemova~ WASH. Posr, Feb. 15, 2006, atA09. 
153. Toone, supra note 72, at 630 (referring to this as occurring "with surprising frequency"); 
see also Ross E. Eisenberg, The Lawyer's &le When the Defendant Seeks Death, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 55 (2001). 
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shot and killed someone who intervened in an attempt to prevent him 
from robbing a Las Vegas casino.154 The defendant was charged with 
capital murder. At his initial arraignment on the charges, he informed 
the court that he wished to proceed pro se and to plead guilty. He did 
exactly that and, at his penalty hearing, he offered no evidence in 
mitigation and also prohibited his standby counsel from doing so. He 
was then sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction and sentence over a strong dissent that referred to the 
proceeding as a "state-sanctioned suicide."155 The Supreme Court 
subsequently denied without opinion the application for a stay of 
execution.156 
Ferguson and Moussaoui are examples of the two most common 
types of pro se defendant: the mentally compromised and tfie egocen-
tric grandee (indeed, perhaps the most common pro se defendant is a 
combination of the two). The experience of these two cases and the 
many others that they represent raises serious questions about self-
representation. How is it possible in a contemporary legal setting to 
imagine a circumstance in which a pro se defendant would not be legally 
harmed by his self-representation? Is it truly appropriate for any mature 
legal system, in the name of an airy concept of "autonomy," to permit 
someone to self-inflict serious legal harm in return for fome self-
imagined exogenous benefit? Guilt alone does not establish a just and 
proper conviction. 157 
B. Harm to Victims and Witnesses 
Dean Schwartzmiller, a 65 year-old plasterer, was charged in Califor-
nia with molesting two eleven-year-old boys over a period of several 
years. Schwartzmiller had been previously convicted on four occasions 
of sex offenses with minors in several western states. Upon his arrest, his 
home was searched and the police discovered an extraordinary 45~ 
page manuscript of log entries that catalogued his sex with young boys 
154. 444 U.S. 807 (1979). 
155. Id. at 808-09 n.l. 
156. Id. The Supreme Court was later to expressly affirm a conviction under similar 
circumstances in Godinezv. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
157. "There are clear detriments when defendants who, by most accounts, should not 
represent themselves because of their mental or intellectual incapacities, are allowed to proceed 
pro se regardless. The defendants in these cases are often sent to jail for long periods of time or 
even put to death, while society's faith in the fairness of our judicial system is greatly undermined 
by a feeling that these sentences are unjust given the circumstances." Sarah Livingston Allen, 
Faretta: Self-Representation ar Legal-Misrepresentation, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1553, 1556-57 (2005). 
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over four decades. 158 The prosecution alleged that he had sexually 
abused some 250 boys over the previous 35 years. Schwartzmiller 
exercised his right to represent himself at trial where the two boys and 
six former victims, now 20 to 50 years old, testified against him. He 
cross-examined each of those witnesses at length in "excruciating 
detail"159 before the jury. He asked if the witnesses remembered kissing 
him and if they enjoyed the sex.160 His encounters with the witnesses 
appeared to cause agony with both the witnesses and the jurors who 
were forced to observe.161 In his summation to the jury, he read long 
accounts of the graphic sex reported by his victims. The jury ultimately 
convicted him on all counts and he was sentenced to 152 years to life. 162 
Susan Polk, 48, stabbed her seventy-year-old husband 27 times with a 
paring knife during the middle of a bitter divorce. 163 She admitted the 
stabbing but claimed it was performed in self-defense and that her 
husband died of a heart attack in any event. After firing two sets of 
private attorneys, she elected to represent herself. 164 Her extraordinary 
four-month trial seemed drafted for reality 1V. Two of her three sons 
testified against her and the third, who testified on her behalf, was 
himself tried and convicted during his mother's trial of beating his 
ex-girlfriend in the same home where his father was killed. 165 The first 
witness for the prosecution was her youngest son, who testified that 
Polk was delusional and manipulative and that she had discussed for 
years her desire to kill her husband. Polk then cross-examined her son 
for four days regarding what the judge described as irrelevant family 
158. John Cote, Serial Abuse Suspect Guilty, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 19, 2006, at Al. 
159. Carolyn Marshall, Serial Child Molester Receives Maximum Term in Califurnia, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 30, 2007, at Al 7 (quoting the prosecutor, Steven Fein). 
160. Cote, supra note 158. 
161. "One woman on the jury grimaced as Schwartzmiller continued his sexually explicit 
questioning while the witness struggled to maintain his composure, frequently sipping water from 
a paper cup and staring at the back wall of the courtroom." Rodney Foo, Pedophile Defends Himself, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 29, 2006, at Bl. 
162. Marshall, supra note 159. 
163. The case is unreported but CourtTV has compiled a series of reports. See Court1V, 
Susan Pofk Murder Trial: Housewife Stabs Husband, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2008). 
164. John Springer, Woman Whose Lawyer's Wife was Murdered Wants to Defend Herself, CoURTTV, 
Jan. 17, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/011306_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). 
165. Lisa Sweetingham, After Days of Rare Calm, Murder Defendant Begins to Create Stir Again, 
CouRTTV, Mar. 25, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/052506_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 
7, 2009). 
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history and "minutiae" which did not concern the actual homicide. 166 
As the cross-examination wore on, the judge observed that: "I believe 
that this cross-examination is bordering on the abusive"167 and "If you 
were an attorney, I would have imposed sanctions by now."168 The 
jurors expressed their own discomfort with the defendant's exhibi-
tion.169 The trial continued in this manner for months. 170 During the 
prosecutor's cross-examination of the son who testified in her behalf, 
she made 30 personalized non-legal objections during the first hour. 171 
At one point, when the trial audience burst out in laughter at one of the 
defendant's performances, the judge was forced to reprimand them: 
"Ladies and gentlemen, this is not for entertainment."172 
Polk had promised the jury during her opening statement that the 
case would be a "nail-biting edge-of-your-seat thriller"173 and she at-
tempted to make good on her promise. She called herself to the stand 
as a witness and then testified in rambling narrative fashion for more 
than 17 hours without any questions being posed to her. She took the 
jury through her life story, complete with childhood photos and 
166. Lisa Sweetingham, Accused Killer Susan Polk Focuses on "Minutiae" in Cross-examination of 
her son, CouRTTV, Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.courttv.com/trials/polk/031306_ctv.html (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2009). 
167. Lisa Sweetingham, Defending Herself in Murder Trial, Susan Polk Incurs judge's Wrath, 
CouRTTV, Mar. 21, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/032006_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 
7, 2009). 
168. Lisa Sweetingham, Susan Polk Accuses Police Witness of Manipulating Her Husband's Dead 
Body, CouRTTV, Mar. 23, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/032206-pm_ctv.html (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2009) . · 
169. Id. ("Several jurors have started openly showing their feelings for the defendant. 
Eye-rolling, quick glances to one another, and barely concealed smirks increased during Polk's 
many confrontations with the witness and the prosecutor."). 
170. Lisa Sweetingham, After Three Tumultuous Months, Closings Expected in Susan Polk's Murder 
Tria~ CouRTTV,June 9, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/060806_ctv.html (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2009) ("The thin, gray-haired defendant is a tireless contrarian. Her defiance of the 
court's rulings, her acid-tongue accusations against the judge, prosecutor, court personnel and 
prosecution witnesses, and her obsessive focus on every mischaracterization or potential slight she 
perceives have caused frustrating delays."). 
171. Lisa Sweetingham, Susan Polk's Outbursts Prompt Judge to Suspend Son's Testimony, CouRTTV, 
Apr. 28, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/042706-pm_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 
2009). Polk's objections included "Objection! Sarcastic and nasty" and "Objection! Randomly 
ambiguous and unintelligible." Id. 
172. Lisa Sweetingham, Accused Killer Susan Polk Goes Off-course While Questioning Detective, 
CouRTTV, Mar. 30, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/032906_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 
7, 2009). 
173. Lisa Sweetingham, Susan Polk Launches Defense with Dramatic opening, CouRTTV, Apr. 26, 
2006, http://www.courttv.com/trials/polk/042406_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). 
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excerpts from her diaries. 174 She told them she had psychic powers and 
had foreseen the tragedy of 9/11 but was not able to prevent it from 
happening because her husband was an Israeli spy.175 On cross-
examination by the prosecutor, she admitted that she had revealed in 
an interview that she thought Winona Ryder might play her in the 
movie version of her life and that Anthony Hopkins (aka Hannibal 
Lecter) might play her dead husband.176 The jury convicted her of 
second-degree murder and the court sentenced her to the maximum 
sentence of 16years to life.177 
These cases illustrate a common feature of prose trials: the defendant 
becoming an abuser. The defendant as self-advocate in an adversarial 
proceeding tends to abuse all of the other participants at trial, particu-
larly his victims and accusers. He also becomes an abuser of the system 
itself. His lack of professional skills renders him incapable, even if 
willing, to comply with the rules of evidence and procedure. As a 
non-professional, he is not subject to the standard controls of the court 
or the embedded culture of the courtroom. Yet he himself has all the 
status and privileges of an attorney when directly confronting his 
accusers. This means that the pro se trial in the modem era cannot be 
viewed as a quaint restoration.of the early common law "bickering" trial 
described earlier. This is no longer a level face-to-face encounter; it is 
now a one-sided bicker with witnesses forced to endure rude and 
irrelevant-and often endless-questioning as the price for their testi-
mony. 
C. Harm to the Attorneys and judges 
Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged twentieth hijacker, never made it to 
trial. Yet over the several years of his court proceedings he maintained a 
steady stream of personal and professional accusations, in written 
motions and courtroom proceedings, against both his standby attor-
neys and the trial judge. He was a non-lawyer in remanded custody and 
therefore was never subject to direct sanction for his behavior. Mous-
174. Lisa Sweetingham, Accused Killer Susan Polk Takes the Stand in Her Own Defense, CouRTTV, 
May 18, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/051706_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). 
175. Id. 
176. Lisa Sweetingham, Susan Polk Defends Laughter During Television Interview as She Wraps Up 
Her Testimony, COURT TV, June 2, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/060206_pm 
_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). 
177. Lisa Sweeti.ngham, Susan Polk, Defiant at Sentencing, Gets Maximum Term far Fatally Stabbing 
Her Husband, CouRTTV, Feb. 26, 2007, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/022307_sentencing_ 
ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). 
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saoui likened the judge to a Nazi, referring to her as a "furor,"178 and 
accused her of being in a conspiracy with his attorneys to have him 
executed.179 He constantly ridiculed his standby attorneys and refused 
to permit them to advise him on any matter, 180 reading aloud from the 
Koran whenever they tried. 181 His lead standby attorney stated that it 
was "almost an Eighth Amendment violation [cruel and unusual punish-
ment] to require us to stay in this case as standby counsel."182 But the 
attorneys and judge had no other choice, given that they were dealing 
with a capital defendant who had a constitutional right to refuse to 
permit a serious defense to be made. 
The lawyer who served as standby counsel at trial for Colin Ferguson, 
the commuter gunman, endured a typical, yet particularly grueling, 
experience. The attorney was himself an immigrant who had attended 
the same high school as Ferguson in Jamaica. He initially joined the 
defense as trial counsel and cared deeply to present a mitigating 
defense for Ferguson based upon his obvious mental deficiencies. But 
when Ferguson elected to proceed prose, his attorney was relegated to 
advisor-only status and Ferguson refused to permit him an active role at 
trial. Forced to sit as a passive hospice at trial, he could "only watch in 
silence from the defense table, where he often slump[ed], clasping his 
head as if trying to prevent it from splitting in frustration." 183 The 
attorney described himself as "disgusted" with the experience and 
threatened to walk away on several occasions during the trial. 184 He 
likened Ferguson's self-representation to "a patient in a doctor's office 
trying to perform his own spinal cord operation."185 The attorney also 
worried about his professional life-after-Ferguson "as indignities pile 
on top of embarrassments, as his law practice frays, as his hard-earned 
reputation is splashed with ridicule."186 
The appointment of standby counsel is a cruel, almost abusive, 
178. Tom Jackman, Terror Suspect Allowed to Seek Foreign Aid, WASH. Posr,July 18, 2002, at B02. 
179. Moscoso, supra note 150. 
180. Motion by Moussaoui: Dunham Mind Your Own Pig Business: Motion to Keep Mad, Out of 
Control Herd of Blood Sucker, out of Hal.a~ Pure Prose Land. 
181. Jackman, supra note 178. 
182. Siobhan Roth, Frank Dunham s Odyssey: Strange Twists Come with the Territ<rry When You 're a 
Lawyer for the '2dh hijacker', LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 2002, at 8. 
183. Jan Hoffman, Hapless Lawyer, Thankless Job; Colin Ferguson's Adviser Sees Reputation and 
Practice Suffer, N.Y. TIMFS, Feb. 14, 1995. 
· 184. Evelyn Nieves, Our Toums: An Anguished Audience in a Theater of the Absurd, N.Y. TIMFS, 
Jan. 31, 1995. 
185. John T. McQuiston, LI.RR Trial Has Adviser 'Disgusteff, N.Y. TIMFS, Jan. 31, 1995. 
186. Hoffman, supra note 183. 
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assignment to limbo. The role contradicts and demeans everything 
essential to the professional integrity (let alone the autonomy) of the 
trial lawyer. The standby attorney is forced to play the fool's fool. No 
matter how professionally abhorrent the scene becomes, the standby 
counsel is prohibited from intervening unless and until the pro se 
defendant calls for help, at which point, if it occurs, the standby 
counsel is expected to step in and perform the miracle of rescuing the 
defendant from his own malpractice. The concept of such a profes-
sional standby is nonsense and it demeans the legal profession to 
pretend otherwise.187 
For the prosecuting attorneys, the experience is different, but not 
much better. The prosecutor in the case of Susan Polk, the woman who 
stabbed her husband, had to contend with an adversary who refused to 
play by the rules and consistently got away with it. The trial judge 
tolerated the defendant's repeated breaches of the rules. While the 
defendant was engaged in prolonged and irrelevant cross-examination 
of her son regarding various family pathologies, the judge only gently 
admonished her: "[a] lot of time's bei.ng spent on minutiae about 
events that are extremely important to you-again, I'm not trying to 
tell you how to try your case-but my concern is that [the jury's] 
attention will be lost for the important things."188 The prosecutor, 
therefore, had to conduct a trial in which his adversary continuously 
interrupted his questioning of witnesses with non-legal objections and 
yet was permitted to testify herself without any questions being posed 
and without any apparent application of the rules of evidence. Per-
. versely, the prose adversary often benefits from preferential treatment 
from both the trial and appellate judges who attempt to minimize the 
costs to justice extracted by the pro se. defendant. 189 The Polk prosecu-
187. There has been some attempt in the recent literature to upgrade the role and the 
practice of the standby attorney and thereby affirm the right to self-representation. The critical 
premise of these articles is that nationally the provision of effective defense counsel is woefully 
inadequate, thereby rendering more reasonable the defendant's choice to forego such suspect 
counsel. While the inadequacy of defense services is indeed a national concern, it hardly seems to 
support the conclusions that: replacing inadequate counsel with a less adequate non-counsel will 
mark an improvement; inadequate trial counsel can somehow be made to perform more, rather 
than less, effectively as standby counsel; eliminating even the possibility of an appeal on ineffective 
counsel grounds is cost-effective; and encouraging more self-representation is an appropriate 
policy initiative for the contemporary American criminal justice system. See, e.g., Hashimoto, supra 
note 4; Poulin, supra note 115. 
188. Sweetingham, supra note 166. 
189. See Allen, supra note 157, at 1558 (analyzing the "circumstantial evidence that the 
federal courts, in some cases, may be giving preferential treatment to convicted defendants .who 
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tor characterized the.proceedings as "absurd" and a "farce" and pleaded 
with the court for "guidance."190 Later he responded to Polk's staccato 
objections by slamming the counsel table in unison with each of them, 
at which point the jury reportedly "froze" and the judge called a 
recess. 191 Things devolved to the point where later in the trial the 
defendant again accused the prosecutor of engaging in unethical 
behavior, referred to him as a "moral creep," and said that he "ought to 
be working in a third-world dictatorship." The beleaguered prosecutor 
could only respond," [a] ctually, it might be preferable to being here."192 
An adversarial proceeding cannot proceed as such when the adversar-
ies are not capable of behaving as such. The system simply implodes. 
"[T]he Faretta right often corrupts the criminal process by replacing 
trained and experienced counsel with an autonomous yet ineffective 
advocate. One adversary, in effect, is removed from the adversarial 
process in the name of autonomy."193 
D. Harm to the System Itself 
While serving time in state prison, Kashani Farhad managed to 
commit a federal offense by fraudulently obtaining a number of federal 
income tax retums.194 He informed the District Court upon his arraign-
ment that he elected to represent himself because he believed that he 
could provide a "more effective defense" than his appointed federal 
defender. Nonetheless, "Farhad's performance at trial was-as every-
one involved except him surely expected-a complete disaster."195 
Farhad believed that his standby counsel, while seated at the defense 
table, was compromising his pro se right, so the judge directed the 
attorney to take a seat in the back of the courtroom for the rest of the 
trial. "Farhad evinced an utter lack of comprehension of the proceed-
ings ... He had only the sketchiest understanding of the roles played 
by various people in the courtroom."196 He made no objections during 
represent themselves at the trial court level."). See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 846 
(Burger, CJ., dissenting) (anticipating the development of appellate nullification following 
non-affinnable pro se convictions). 
190. Sweetingham, supra note 172. 
191. Sweetingham, supra note 168. 
192. Lisa Sweetingham, The Murder Defendant lsn 't Laughing, but Some Others Are, COVRTTV, 
May 12, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/051206_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). 
193. Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 133, at 169. 
194. U.S. v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 
195. Id. at 1102. 
196. Id. at 1104. 
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the prosecution's case. He put himself on the stand during the defense 
case and tried to conduct the direct. by posing questions to himself. He 
also provided the jury with a handwriting exe,rriplar during his direct 
but the court subsequently had to instruct the jury not to consider the 
content of the exemplar. Farhad had written: "Farhad is an innocent 
man."197 His closing argument to the jury was a "debacle"198 which 
ended with a twist. "Farhad wrapped up his summation in style, asking 
the jury to find him guilty by returning 'a true verdict, a just verdict, that 
the prosecution has proved its allegation.'"199 The jury did just that. 
Farhad was one of the many pro se cases that pass under the public 
radar. It was not a particularly remarkable case and, under Faretta, 
raised almost no serious issues of law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
conviction in a per curiam opinion.200 The case is noteworthy, however, 
for the remarkable concurring opinion of Circuit Court Judge Stephen 
Reinhardt. Reinhardt felt "bound by Faretta" to affirm the conviction 
but concurred separately in order to urge the Supreme Court to 
reconsider the holding in that case.201 His argument was direct and 
simple: the right to self-representation could not be permitted to 
trump the more fundamental right to a fair trial: 
[T]he Court has never directly addressed the argument of the 
Faretta dissenters that the Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation would lead to unfair trials and unjust convic-
tions. By now, it is clear that the dissenters' concerns have been 
borne out. Farhad's trial illustrates the effect of this conflict, 
one that the Court now has the opportunity to face squarely. 
Under Faretta, courts have no occasion to assess the conse-
quences of the waiver of the right to counsel on the constitution-
ality of the trial itself. Nevertheless, on the record, it is quite 
plain that Farhad, like many criminal defendants who choose to 
be tried without a lawyer, was convicted in a proceeding so 
fundamentally flawed that, were it not for Faretta, it would 
undoubtedly offend minimal constitutional standards of fair-
ness. 202 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at ll05. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 1101 (Reinhardt,], concurnng). 
202. Id. 
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Judge Reinhardt presented an impassioned argument that Faretta has 
failed. He lamented the fact that courts everywhere were forced to 
participate in these prose travesties of justice-and to do so in the name 
of the Constitution. "We thus become a judiciary '\\j.th eyes wide shut' 
... Such was the case here and, as required by Faretta, we have averted 
our gaze-as one might from a train wreck or a freeway crash-from 
Farhad's pitiful attempt to, in his own words, 'make a more glorious 
kind of defense. "'203 He reiterated the profound and pervasive commit-
ment in the Supreme Court case law that the right to a fair trial is 
fundamental to all of the other trial-related rights and argued that cases 
like Farhad were a self-inflicted wound without justification. "It is, thus, 
not only the defendant, who 'suffers the consequences' [from Faretta] 
when a fair trial is denied, but the justice system itself."204 The Supreme 
Court did not accept Judge Reinhardt's invitation to reconsider Faretta 
and denied certiorari. 205 
International criminal courts and tribunals, following the precedent 
set at Nuremberg, are dedicated in large part to constructing the 
authorized record, the historical narrative, of the grave crimes sub 
Judice. Given the circumstances typical of such criminality, that goal is 
sufficiently challenging even with a functioning and competent de-
fense counsel. But the foregoing stories of high profile pro se cases 
demonstrate how self-representation threatens to fatally undermine 
that goal. In pro se cases the primary story, the· critical narrative 
witnessed by the public, becomes the story of the pro se proceeding: a 
spectacle unto itself, often more immediate and compelling than the 
underlying crimes. The American experience with self-representation 
is not directly transferable to any other legal system, particularly an 
international system. The exaggerated consequences in these cases can 
perhaps best be understood as another unique aspect of the American 
adventure in exceptionalism. But the American experience is at the 
very least foreboding and indeed foretelling, as we will see below in 
examining several of the. recent trials of the international tribunals. · 
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT 
Given the compromised history and experience of self-representa-
tion in the common law system, why would the nascent international 
system of criminal justice make an informed choice to burden its own 
203. Id. at 1102. 
204. Id. at 1107. 
205. Farhad v. U.S., 529 U.S. 1023 (2000). 
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historic m1ss10n by adopting such a right for its own courts and 
tribunals? The best answer, it would appear, is that the international 
system never made such an informed choice. Self-representation slipped 
unnoticed through the international door at Nuremberg, where the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal included a right to 
self-represent but not a right to have counsel assigned.206 The right 
received no notice and was of no consequence since none of the Nazi 
war criminals elected to represent themselves.207 The right was thereaf-
ter incorporated, again without review or consequence, in the seminal 
document that inaugurated the "rights of the accused" in international 
criminal proceedings: the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).208 The ICCPR rights of the accused then became a 
standard package of rights that were incorporated wholesale in a broad 
number of newly established national constitutions and international 
conventions. Again, the individual right of self-representation typically 
generated little notice and no critical review. That same package of 
rights was ultimately incorporated in the rules governing the interim 
criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where the individual 
right would receive its first consequential review outside the common 
law system. 
But at this critical point of first-impression review, the beleaguered 
jurists on the international tribunals have found themselves in the same 
compromised posture as American trial judges in the post-Faretta era. 
They are forced to recognize an outmoded and dysfunctional privilege 
that was carelessly enshrined in an earlier and much-removed setting as 
206. Agreement and Charter, International Conference on Military Trials (London, 1945), 
Art. 16 (d) available at.http:/ /avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack60.asp (stating that a defendant shall 
have the right to conduct his own defense before the 'fribunal or to have the assistance of 
Counsel). 
207. Albert Goering apparently intended at the outset to self-represent but reversed himself 
almost immediately. "There is astonishing newsreel footage of Goering, called upon to plead, 
marching confidently to the microphone with a sheaf of notes for a political diatribe. Justice 
Geoffrey Lawrence, presiding, curtly informs him that he must say either "Guilty" or "Not Guilty", 
whereupon the camera catches the collapse of stout party as Goering obediently drops his notes, 
meekly denies his guilt, and stumbles back, a broken man, to his place in the dock. To the modern 
war crimes judge, that clip appears utterly nostalgic, in courts where defendants rant and rage and 
boycott and generally treat their trial as a continuation of war by other means." Geoffrey 
Robertson, General Editor's Introduction to Essays on Fairness and Evidence in War Crimes Trials, 4 IN1"L 
COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE I, at 2 (2006), available at http:/ /www.bepress.com/ice/vol4/issl/artl. 
208. ICCPR, supra n. 13, art. 14 (3) (d) ("In the determination of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality ... to be 
tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing"). 
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a near-absolute, and therefore unavoidable, right of both normative 
and semi-immutable status. As might be expected, the same right that 
has proven to be dysfunctional in a modern common law system is 
incompatible within the structural and normative matrix of a contem-
porary international criminal tribunal. The initial encounters of the 
temporary international tribunals with the right of self-representation 
have already proven compromising-in some cases disastrously so-
and must not be perpetuated by the first permanent international 
criminal court, the ICC, if that court is to have any chance of achieving 
the formidable goals that have been set for it. 
A. The Initial Adoption 
The history of the careless adoption of a right of self-representation 
in the international arena bears many resemblances to that of its 
American counterpart. The true right at issue was the right to be 
represented by counsel; the "right" to self-represent was simply the 
default, not the commensurate, alternative in a system where accused 
individuals without resources had no right to state-assigned counsel. 
The right to counsel and the right to self-represent were never either 
normative or utilitarian equivalents. The drafters of the American 
Constitution, as we have seen, did not even include a passing reference 
to self-representation in the Sixth Amendment.209 In the international 
context there was never any discussion or reference to an independent 
or transcendent value to self-representation. As with the American 
experience, the critical concern was always with expanding and ensur-
ing the right to be represented by professional counsel. 
The drafting of the U.N. Charter in 1945 led to the call for the 
drafting of an international bill of rights, reminiscent of the post-
constitutional drafting history of the American Bill of Rights. 210 The 
original working draft for such a bill, the so-called Secretariat Outline, 
contained no mention of a right of self-representation. The first 
submission of proposals by the United States contained a reference 
only to the aid of counsel.211 The discussions that developed around 
the right of representation centered upon several issues: the right to 
209. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) 
210. DAVID WEISSBRODT, THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CML AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: BACKGROUND, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATIONS 5 (2001). 
211. U.N. Econ. & Soc. [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights Second Session, Proposal 
Fur a Human Rights Convention Submitted b-y the Representative of the United States on The Commission on 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/37 (Nov. 27, 1947). 
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assistance of counsel; the right to counsel of one's choosing; the right 
to assignment of counsel; and the light to notice of the various rights to 
counsel. There appears to have been no discussion of the right to 
self-representation.212 The first mention of such a right appeared in a 
proposed amendment submitted by the Philippines which reduced the 
counsel rights to the right to defend oneself in person or through legal 
assistance of one's own choosing.213 This proposed amendment was 
not acted upon as such; however, the language was subsequently 
included in a joint proposal submitted by five countries, including the 
United States, which was adopted.214 That language is now included in 
ICCPR Section 14(3)(d): Rights of the Accused. Despite the wide-
spread adoption of this section in subsequent national constitutions 
and international conventions, prior to its recent activation in the 
various international criminal tribunals it had been interpreted by 
· leading experts in international' law as providing a strictly qualified 
"complementary" right of the accused to participate in the trial only to 
the extent that it did not otherwise compromise the integrity of the 
process. 215 · 
It was only after this self-representation language entered the ICCPR 
draft that the drafters finally agreed, after considerable debate, to 
include a guaranteed, or subsidized, right to counsel.216 It is therefore 
fair to say that the modern system of international criminal justice has 
entered its own post-Gideon era with a commitment to provide every 
defendant with professional counsel to ensure an "equality of arms," 
212. "According to the official records, no discussion ensued concerning an absolute right to 
defend oneself; rather the delegates were solely concerned about the right to access counsel, the 
choice of counsel, and who pays for counsel if the defendant is indigent." Michael P. Scharf & 
Christopher M. Rassi, Do Former Leaders have an International Right to Self-Representation in War Crimes 
Trials?, 20 Omo sr.]. ON D1sr. REsoL. 3, 12 (2005). 
213. U.N. Econ. & Soc. [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights Fifth Session, Draft 
International Convenant on Human Rights, Philippines: Amendment to Articles 13, 15, 20, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/232 (May 23, 1949). 
214. U.N. Econ. & Soc. [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights Fifth Session, Draft 
International Convenant on Human Rights, Article 13, Chile, Egypt, France Philippine and United States of 
America:JointProposa~ U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/286,(2June 1949). 
215. "The right to self-representation complements the right to counsel and is not meant as a 
substitute thereof .... Thus the court should appoint professional counsel to supplement 
self-representation; conversely, whenever it is in the best interests of justice and in the interest of 
adequate and effective representation of the accused, the court should disallow self-representa-
tion and appoint professional counsel." M. CherifBassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal 
Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitu-
tions, 3 DUKE]. COMP. & INf'L L. 235, 283-84 (1993). 
216. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(3) (d). 
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the civil/international law counterpart to adversarial due process.217 
B. The Structural Incompatibility 
Perhaps the most abiding assumption in the field of comparative law 
scholarship is that the procedural rights and mechanisms of one system 
are not appropriate for direct transfer (or "transplantation") to a 
foreign system, however normatively inscribed those rights may be in 
their native (or "host") format, unless demonstrated to be compatible 
with the critical structural features of the recipient body of laws and 
institutions.2.18 We have already seen how the entitlement to self-
representation has become a dysfunctional appendage even within the 
contemporary American constitutional system where the normative set 
points, or defaults, have been structurally and materially transformed. 
Yet this "vertical" incompatibility that has developed internally over an 
extended period of time pales in comparison to the manifold structural 
incompatibilities that are present with the "horizontal" attempt to 
embed this right within the contemporary framework of an interna-
tional court or tribunal. Whatever lingering value there may be to the 
practice of self-representation in the American setting, it is a pointless 
exercise in the international setting. 
The number of pertinent differences between the traditional com-
mon law adversarial system and the new systems of international 
criminal justice are legion. A comparison drawn against the stnictural 
features of the new standard-bearer in the international forum, the 
ICC, will make the point. We will emphasize here the following critical, 
if not dispositive, differences: the trial proceeding at the ICC is not 
constructed to serve as an essentially democratic institution. There is 
no lay jury, no citizen "peers" of the defendant, in .a trial at the ICC. 
There is nothing of a political or normative nature, not even a common 
language, which is presumptively shared between the defendant and 
his triers. There is no political sovereign at the ICC bringing a criminal 
charge against one of its subjects; the defendant is more typically a 
sovereign representative himself being prosecuted by a non-sovereign 
entity. The ICC is a free-standing judicial institution; it maintains no 
authority-political, social, economic, or military-independent of its 
limited judicial authority. The mission of the ICC is not to render a 
217. See generally Stefania Negri, The Principle of "Equality of Arms" and the Evolving Law of 
International Criminal Procedure, 5 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 513 (2005). 
218. See generally Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM.J. COMP. L 163 (2003); 
Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM.J. CoMP. L. 335 (1996). 
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politically acceptable verdict to repair an established social order but 
rather to produce a literal verdict based upon an objective rendering of 
the historical record. There can be no fair trial before the ICC that is 
not independently grounded in that historical "truth." The libertarian 
concept of autonomy has a highly reduced role to play in the ICC 
setting, where the defendant is not making existential, self-defining 
choices that have themselves been legitimated by a pertinent indig-
enous community. 
The common law jury trial is an iconic political institution. It is 
traditionally thought to exemplify a commitment to democratic self-
government. It is a sovereign power of the people capable of negating · 
the power of the state to use its powers of criminal prosecution against 
its citizens. It has been deemed to be the "birthright" of every English-
man.219 Jefferson referred to it as "the only anchor ever yet imagined by 
man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its 
constitution."220 Tocqueville observed that it was "as direct and ex-
treme a consequence of the dogma of the sovereignty of the people as 
universal suffrage."221 It is within the context of this trial dogma of 
representative self-government that the practice of self-representation 
has assumed a democratic aura, if not dogma, of its own. But in 
countries outside the common law network, the institution of trial is 
typically not intended to serve this democratic function, and it certainly 
cannot assume such a function in the free-standing, non-sovereign 
setting of the ICC, where there is no demos, either in the form of the 
defendant himself or in that of the jury, represented at the trial. 
The idealized democratic iconography of the pro se defendant in-
vokes a plain-speaking individual appealing his case of unwarranted 
prosecution directly to an engaged jury of fellow citizens bearing no 
formal allegiance to the state. The heroic imagery never contemplates 
such a prose defendant trying his case directly to a panel of state officials 
in robes. The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the right of 
self-representation has no application beyond the trial courtlevel.222 In 
the international system, as in the civil law system, there is never a panel 
of lay jurors. At the ICC, the defendant will be tried before a mixed 
219. TRIAL BY JURY: THE BIRTil-RIGIIT OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGlAND (London, 1865). 
220. THOMAS JEFFERSON, 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 27 MARCH 1789-30 NOVEMBER 
1789, 269 (Julian Boyd ed., 1958). 
221. ALExls DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 261 (Haivey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop, eds. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835). 
222. Martinez v. California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000). 
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panel of three international jurists. 223 This fact alone should be disposi-
tive with regard to the structural incompatibility of the self-representa-
tion transplant in the international criminal justice system. The image 
of a defendant, perhaps himself a former sovereign representative, 
presenting his own case to a panel of professional international jurists 
from various countries other than his own, with no shared social or 
political culture to rely upon, bears none of the indicia of a self-
determining sovereign people essential to the mystique of self-
representation. Furthermore, as Michael Scharf and Christopher Rassi 
have noted,224 the narrow spectrum of defendants subject to a war 
crimes prosecution are precisely those politically engaged individuals 
who are most likely to view a criminal trial, like diplomacy, as merely a 
continuation of hostilities by other means. 
The classical liberal individualism that supported the development 
of the common law adversarial system presumes a central antagonism, a 
clash of adverse interests, between the individual and the state, which is 
deemed to have an inherent governing interest in restraining the 
native liberties of its subjects. The state is therefore held to be inher-
ently suspect or at least self-interested when seeking to deprive any 
individual of his liberty. This mistrust of the power of public prosecu-
tion has supported the libertarian notion that the accused may reason-
ably believe that he has only himself to trust fully when engaged in a 
struggle for his liberty in one of the state's own forums. The image of a 
self-representing citizen standing alone against the prosecutorial power 
of the state provides the native appeal of self-representation. This 
deference to a much-exalted notion of embattled autonomy directed 
against the state has permitted the Supreme Court in Faretta to acknowl-
edge both the absolute right to self-represent. while simultaneously 
recognizing that it was "undeniable" that such a choice would in most 
cases prove harmful to the defendant and that "[t]he defendant, and 
not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a 
conviction."225 It is inconceivable that the ICC, a strictly judicial non-
sovereign institution that will try almost exclusively high-profile cases, 
will be able to adopt such a deferential and cavalier approach to the 
responsibility of the court to remain accountable for the integrity of its 
own proceedings and the credible outcomes of the trials it conducts. 
The common law adversarial system is also commonly conceded to 
223. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 39(2) (b) (ii), July 17, 1998, 37 
I.L.M. 999. 
224. Scharf & Rassi, supra note 212. 
225. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975). 
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have a lesser commitment to establishing the objective "tnith" of the 
facts at issue in a criminal trial when compared to its civil law counter-
parts.226 The civil law system is said to be strictly committed to determin-
ing a more objective historical tnith, while the common law system is 
thought to require only a systemic, or contingent, truth that permits 
the lay jury to resolve the conflict between the opposing parties. The 
adversarial philosophy supporting that system . reflects a classically 
liberal laissez-faire approach to the production of truth. The silent 
premise is that truth itself is a marketable concept that is best arrived at 
through a minimally regulated market mechanism, the trial, which 
provides a fair competition between self-interested parties. The compet-
ing parties, the state and the accused, are therefore permitted to 
pursue only a truth that supports their interest in the outcome of the 
case. The court itself is deemed not to have any overriding interest in 
the proceeding, which includes not having any interest in securing an . 
independent or objective truth not developed by the parties them-
selves. It is this premise of party-responsibility for developing the truth 
that has permitted American courts to ignore the fact that self-
represented individuals commonly refuse to introduce evidence that 
would, as a matter of law, tend to demonstrate a mitigating or even 
exculpating condition-even in circumstances where the accused is 
facing a capital conviction. 227 This common law/ civil law divide is even 
more pronounced with regard to international tribunals which have 
typically, if not completely, assumed the mantel of the Nuremberg 
tribunal to compile a true and accurate historical record for the world 
community. 228 Already, international tribunals have begun to move 
away from the more party-directed adversarial trial and towards a more 
judge-directed trial where there is less sacrifice to the integrity of the 
historical record. 229 
Self-representation as an expression of political autonomy also has 
virtually no grounding in the modem template of international crimi-
nal justice. As described earlier, the principle of autonomy as the 
226. See generally Mirjan Damaska, Evidentary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506 (1973). 
~27. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (circuit court refused to 
permit the trial court to appoint counsel to present mitigating evidence at a capital proceeding). 
228. See Patricia M. Wald, Foreword: War Tales and War Trials, 106 MICH. L. REv. 901, 911 
(2008) (noting that recent experience, including her own as a judge at both American and ICIY 
proceedings, has called into question "whether judges and adversary proceedings are indeed the 
best way to ferret out historical truth (if such a thing can be determined)."). 
229. Kai Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: "adversarial", "inquisitorial" or mixecP., 3 INT'L 
CRIM. L. REv 1, 18 (2003). 
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primary philosophical support for a freedom of choice regarding 
individual self-identity is not self-sustaining. The choice at issue must 
itself be independently validated as a normatively sanctioned option. 
Self-representation has not obtained such recognition within the vari-
ous institutions of international law. Outside the common law system, 
self-representation is not recognized to have intrinsic value. An indi-
vidual charged today with war crimes, crimes against humanity or 
genocide in a non-common law national forum would have no such 
right.230 "Given the contrary widespread practice of the civil law 
countries, it would be difficult to properly conclude that the right of 
self-representation has in fact attained the level of customary interna-
tional law .... "231 International law, beginning at Nuremberg and as 
now reflected in the several recent international criminal tribunals and 
the ICC, has certainly assigned a clear value to the common law 
adversarial trial system.232 But the various conventions and working 
groups that have constructed these more recent international courts 
and tribunals have never examined and assigned a value to self-
representation as such. This silence suggests that self-representation 
has simply been assumed to be a necessary adjunct to the adoption of 
the adversarial system. But this is not the case. For example, the right to 
a lay jury is one of the more revered adversarial entitlements in the 
common law system, yet international law, beginning with Nuremberg, 
has rejected it as a necessary element of international criminal justice. 
Self-representation, particularly absent a lay jury, is entitled to no 
greater accommodation as an essential choice of right within the 
evolving structures of international adversarial justice. 
230. Despite the fact that self-representation is not recognized in the continental European 
countries and most such countries have national laws which permit compulsory representation by 
counsel, neither the Human Rights Committee (HRC), which monitors compliance with the right 
of self-representation in ICCPR art. 14(3)( d), nor the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
which has jurisdiction over violations of the identical language in the European Convention on 
Human Rights art. 6(3) ( c), has ever developed a line of cases which essentially repudiate the laws 
and practices in those countries. The single case before the HRC which did uphold a right of 
self-representation, Hill v. Spain; was decided on the limited basis of an exceptional set of facts. 
For a discussion of the limited opinion in Hill, see Scharf & Rassi, supra note 212, at 16. 
231. Scharf, supra note 1, at 36. 
232. "It is generally recognized that the adversarial system is more suitable when it comes to 
offering protection to the rights of the accused." SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INT'L 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 16 (2003). 
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C. The International Cases 
Until the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (IC1Y), 
there had never been an' instance of self-representation before an 
international criminal tribunal. The primary examples of self-represen-
tation have taken place at the IC1Y, but there have also been a few 
near-occurrences at several of the other contemporary tribunals. Each 
of the tribunals has found itself required to recognize at the outset that 
there is a right of self-representation but only the IC1Y has found itself 
bound to implement the right. The other tribunals have contrived ways 
to avoid the right. But no matter where or how the right has been raised 
in the courtroom, it has raised trouble for the tribunal-in some cases, 
quite serious trouble. 
The signature proceeding of the contemporary international cam-
paign against impunity occurred with the IC1Y prosecution of Slobo-
dan Miloseyic, the first head of state to be prosecuted for war crimes by 
any international criminal tribunal. Unfortunately, the prosecution 
became a signature failure in several critical respects. Foremost was the 
fact that the prosecution failed even to be completed; after years of 
protracted and interrupted proceedings, the trial was terminated when 
the accused died of a. heart attack. More significantly for purposes of 
this discussion, the trial failed because its major confrontation with 
impunity was both obstructed and compromised; the integrity and 
·professional competence of the tribunal itself was impugned; and the 
trial proceeding actually served to resurrect, rather than to condemn, 
the status of the accused in his native Serbia with regard to allegations 
of his having directed a national campaign of genocide and related 
atrocities. The critical factor that contributed to each of these failures 
was that the defendant was permitted to self-represent. 
Slobodan Milosevic was President of Serbia and then the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia during the Balkan Wars that raged during the 
period 1991-1999. Beginning in May 1999, he was charged in three 
separate indictments for multiple war crimes committed in Kosovo, 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was arrested in April 2001, and 
transferred to the IC1Y in June of that year. At his initial appearance 
before the IC1Y Trial Chamber in July 2001, he refused to recognize 
the legitimacy of the court, refused to enter a plea to the indictment 
and refused the assignment of counsel. He repeatedly attempted to . 
deliver a diatribe against the court itself as an "illegal" and "false" 
tribunal, as a result of which the presiding judge, Richard May, ulti-
mately had the defendant's microphone cut off with the hopeful words: 
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"Mr. Milosevic, this is not the time for speeches."233 The court did,· 
however, accept without challenge Milosevic's right to self-represent.234 
Milosevic was at that point asserting a right as a defendant that he 
would not have enjoyed in his own country; the statutes of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia would have required him to be represented by 
counsel on such charges.235 Thus began the trial odyssey that endured 
for over four years without coming near to completion. 
The Trial Chamber was exceptionally accommodating to Milosevic. 
In August 2001, six months prior to the start of the trial itself, the court 
sua sponte ordered the assignment of three amici curiae who were to 
serve strictly as friends of the court, and not as counsel to Milosevic, in 
order to assist the court in providing a fair trial to the accused. At the 
same time, the court denied a request by the prosecutor to appoint 
defense counsel to the defendant. In November of that year and 
thereafter the court also recognized various counsel, designated by the 
defendant, as "legal associates" who obtained various counselor privi-
leges but were officially neither friends of the court nor counsel to the 
defendant. Milosevic, certainly no ordinary fool, managed from the 
outset to take extended advantage of the court's largesse. "Bending 
over backward to maintain the appearance of fairness, the Trial Cham-
ber ... permitted Milosevic to treat the witnesses, prosecutors, and 
themselves in a manner that would earn ordinary defense counsel 
expulsion from the courtroom."236 The court nonetheless continued to 
accommodate Milosevic even as his health deteriorated as a result of a 
severe high blood pressure condition. The court gradually reduced the 
number of trial days per week, the number of hours per trial day and 
also granted a series of extended adjournments of the trial. Eventually 
the Trial Chamber resorted to directing the prosecution to pare down 
its list of witnesses "to the point where prosecutors claim[ed] their case 
[was] being emasculated. "237 
233. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-02-54, Initial Appearance 5 Uuly 3, 2001), availab/£ at 
http:/ /www.un.org/icty/. 
234. "You do have the right, of course, to defend yourself." Id. at 1. 
235. Article 71 ( 1) of The Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Serbia, based upon 
the earlier code of the Republic of Yugoslavia, requires defense counsel in all cases where the 
defendant faces a possible sentence of ten years or more, availah/£ at http:/ /www.legislationline.org/ 
documents/ section/ criminal-codes/ country I 5. 
236. Scharf & Rassi, supra note 212, at 4-5. 
2:37. Mirko Klarin, War Crimes Manipulation: Slobodan Milosevic's Refusal to Accept Help in his 
War Crimes Trial is Making it Difficult to Provide him a Fair Hearing, LoNDON FREE PREss, August 24, 
2002 at F4, cited in Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Tria~ 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 915, N7 
(2005). 
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Throughout the trial, the prosecutor maintained that the court 
should appoint formal defense counsel to Milosevic. Approximately 
nine months into the trial, the prosecutor initiated another such 
request with a new tactic. He relied upon an English case, McKenzie v. 
McKenzie, 238 which would have permitted the Trial Chamber to appoint 
a particularized version of standby counsel commonly referred to as a 
"McKenzie friend." During the court colloquy on his request, the 
prosecutor passed forward a· copy of the McKenzie case. Milosevic's 
immediate response drew the line clearly: 
As-despite my referring to all these international pacts and 
covenants, European, American, Roman etcetera, the opposing 
party is now once again ref erring to court practice and is 
offering up McKenzie versus McKenzie. I am also going to 
provide you with something. It is a copy from a court case, and it 
is Faretta versus California, the United States Court, where 
quite clearly once again it excludes the possibility of having 
anybody impose a Defence counsel or lawyer to anybody unless 
the accused wishes to appoint one himself. So I think it is 
useless to carry on a discussion of this kind. 239 
Milosevic was not alone in his belief that Faretta was the touchstone 
reference for the right of self-representation in international as well as 
American law. Following a series of oral decisions and comments 
recognizing Milosevic's right to proceed pro se, the Trial Chamber 
issued a full-length written opinion expressing its "Reasons" for deny-: 
ing the prosecution's motions for the appointment of counsel.240 The 
court began its discussion by establishing that the ICTY was an essen-
tially adversarial forum. 241 What followed was a clear reliance on Faretta 
as the seminal statement of the role of the right of self-representation 
in such an adversarial setting: 
238. 1970 3 All. E. R. 1034. 
239. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT--02-54, Transcript at 12840 (Nov. 11, 2002). available at 
http:/ /www.un.org/icty /transe54/021ll1ED.htm. 
240. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT--02-54, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion 
Concerning Assignment of Counsel (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
milosevic/ trialc/ decision-e/040403.htm. 
241. "[T]he proceedings of the International Tribunal are essentially adversarial and it is 
against that background that this Discussion must follow." Id. at 1 20. 
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Adversarial proceedings are a feature of the common law and 
find little echo in systems based on civil law. As the Amici Curiae 
have correctly observed, the imposition of a defence counsel 
upon an accused who does not want one is a feature of 
inquisitorial systems, but not of the adversarial systems ... The 
reasons for this common law rule are clearly set out by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Faretta v. California ... 242 
The Trial Chamber would later refer back to this reliance on Faretta 
for having set out "the classical statement of the right to self-
representation."243 The Trial Chamber insisted that the Tribunal had 
to be understood as one that had adopted the common law/adversarial 
system as opposed to the civil law/inquisitorial system, and furthermore 
that the right of self-representation was itself inherent in or essential to 
that adversarial structure. Judge Richard May, the author of the opin-
ion, apparently did not share the insight of his fellow British jurist, 
Geoffrey Robertson, an Appeal Judge for the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, who later stated, "Courts which are 'international' must accom-
modate judges and lawyers from disparate legal traditions and adapt 
the adversary model developed for Anglo-American jury trial to a 
system in which guilt is established through judicial reasoning, and to 
procedures influenced by the inquisitorial models adopted by Euro-
pean countries."244 
Milosevic continued to represent himself throughout the prosecu-
tion's case. When the prosecution concluded its case in February, 2004, 
things began to come apart. Ill health forced presiding Judge May to 
resign from the trial panel. He was replaced by Judge Iain Bonomy and 
Patrick Robinson became the PresidingJudge. On July 5, 2004, the new 
trial panel initiated a "radical review"245 of the conduct of the proceed-
ings in light of the fact that the trial was obviously flagging and the 
defendant continued to insist on lengthy adjournments to address his 
own ill health. Finally, on August 31, 2004, the defense began its case 
with a two-day opening statement by Milosevic. Several days later, the 
court issued an oral ruling on the most recent motion by the prosecu-
tion to appoint defense counsel. Over the defendant's strenuous 
242. Id. at 11 21-22. 
243. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-02-54, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence 
Counsel 145 (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/ 
040922.htm. 
244. Robertson, supra note 207, at 2-3. 
245. Prosecutorv. Milosevic, No. IT-02-54, Hearing 32153-4 (July 5, 2004). 
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objection, the court directed that counsel be assigned. The court 
attempted to rationalize its decision not as a restriction on the defen-
dant's right to self-represent but rather as a measure designed to 
protect his superior right to a fair trial. As part of its decision, the Trial 
Chamber issued an Order on the Modalities to be Followed by Court 
Assigned Counsel, in which it outlined a primary role for the assigned 
counsel in the presentation of the defense case. The following day, two 
of the amici were appointed as defense counsel. They immediately 
appealed their assignment. 
The Appeals Chamber accepted, in the light of Milosevic's continued 
episodes of ill health, the appointment of counsel. But the appeals panel 
sharply reversed the Order on Modalities as presenting an excessive and 
disproportional restriction on the defendant's right to self-representation. 
Once again, the court turned to Faretta to provide the rationale for a right 
deemed to be universally recognized as an inherent and essential compo-
nent of a fair trial in an adversarial setting: 
This is a straightforward proposition: given the text's binary 
opposition between representation "through legal assistance" 
and representation "in person," the Appeals Chamber sees no 
reasonable way to interpret Article 21 except as a guarantee of 
the right to self-representation. Nor should this right be taken 
lightly. The drafters of the Statute clearly viewed the right to 
self-representation as an indispensable cornerstone of justice, 
placing it on a structural par with the defendants' right to 
remain silent, to confront the witnesses against them, to a 
speedy trial, and even to demand a court-appointed attorney if 
they cannot afford one themselves. In the words of the United 
States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, which was recog-
nized by the Trial Chamber as ~e classic statement of the right 
to self-representation, an "unwanted counsel 'represents' the 
defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal 
fiction," such that "counsel [becomes] not an assistant, but a 
master." Defendants before this tribunal, then, have the pre-
sumptive right to represent themselves notwithstanding a Trial 
Chamber's judgment that they would be better off if repre-
sented by counsel.246 
246. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-02-54, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial 
Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel 1 11 (Nov. 1, 2004), available at 
http:/ /www.un.org/icty /milosevic/appeal/ decision-e/041101.htm. 
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The trial continued to stumble along until Milosevic died in his cell 
on March 11, 2006. The trial was terminated three days later, thus 
ending, without conclusion, international law's first and only major 
experience with a self-represented defendant at a war crimes trial. The 
public reaction has been unforgiving. The BBC News immediately 
intoned, regarding the termination: "It raises questions which may 
tarnish the reputation of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (IC1Y) and undermine confidence in war crimes justice 
generally."247 The trial appeared to have turned the concern with 
"victor's justice" on its head: 
Throughout the proceedings, Milosevic berated witnesses and 
launched scathing attacks against the legitimacy of the tribunal. 
His tactics have had some resonance back home as Milosevic's 
approval ratings have doubled, and he has gone from the most 
reviled individual in Serbia to number four on the list of most 
admired Serbs.248 
"He played to his supporters back in Serbia, put his accusers on the 
defensive, and in general, turned the trial into an international spec-
tacle."249 This was hardly an outcome consistent with the ambitions of 
the contemporary international campaign to end impunity and restore 
a public state of justice. 
The Milosevic trial may prove to·_be the dispositive experiment with 
self-representation in the international arena. Both the Trial and 
Appeals Chambers presented an exalted view of the need to safeguard 
a defendant's right to self-represent and were enormously generous in 
the degree to which they accommodated that right. Yet, in the end, it 
appeared rather pointless. The trial proceedings were characterized as 
farcical by observers on all sides and there were no positive revelations 
with. regard to the putative existential or liberty interests said to inhere 
in the practice of self-representation. Rather, Milosevic transformed 
the right to self-represent into a spectacle which he enjoyed and abused 
at least as much as his American counterparts in the trials described 
above. 
24 7. Jon Silverman, Worst outcome fm- Milosevic tribunal, BBC NEWS, Mar. 11, 2006, http:/ I 
news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/world/ europe/ 4 797696.stm. 
248. Milan Markovic, In the Interests of Justice?: A Critique of the JCTY Trial Court's Decision to 
Assign Counsel to Slobodan Milosevic, 18 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 947, 947 (2005). 
249. Jerrold M. Post & Lara K. Panis, Tyranny on Trial: Personality and Courtroom Conduct of 
Defendants Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, 38 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 823, 825-26 (2005). 
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It did not take long for the legacy of the Milosevic trial to be fully 
realized. As the Milosevic case was fitfully wending it<> way through the 
tribunal, the case of another Serbian political leader, Vojislav Seselj, 
was slowly taxiing into position for a trial that has managed to outdo the 
spectacle and failure of the Milosevic trial in almost every respect. 250 
"Seselj's court manner has been much more threatening and insidious 
than Milosevic's, the freedom he eajoys in court considerably greater 
(gone is the remotely controlled microphone that the late Judge May 
used to silence Milosevic), and the semblance of a criminal proceeding 
even harder to locate in this case."251 Seselj was a radical Serb national-
ist who assumed major credit for developing the ideology of ethnic 
cleansing. He was a major political activist who was noted for his 
incendiary nationalist rhetoric on behalf of his crusade for a Greater 
Serbia. In the early stages of the Balkan conflict he was positioned as an 
ally of Milosevic but he rather quickly evolved into an outspoken rival. 
Milosevic himself once referred to Seselj as the "personification of 
violence and primitiveness."252 He appeared to relish the opportunity 
to extend his rivalry with Milosevic by utterly, and outrageously, outper-
forming him on the stage of his own trial. 
Seselj appears to have well understood the opportunity for spectacle 
presented by a war crimes tribunal. As early as 1994, shortly after the 
formation of the IC'IY, Seselj stated in an interview: "Personally, I do 
not recognize this Hague tribunal. I think it has no legal foundation, 
but if I am ever invited to The Hague I'll gladly go there immediately. I 
would never miss such a show."253 His trial produced a publicly 
broadcast campaign for political martyrdom. In the four-hour opening 
statement he eventually presented at his trial, during which he repeat-
edly denigrated the judges and prosecutors, he closed by thanking 
them "for allowing me to suffer for my ideology." He also expressed his 
greatest regret that the Tribunal did not have a death penalty "so that 
.proudly, with dignity, my head upright like my friend Saddam Hussein, 
I could die and put the final seal on my ideology. It would become 
250. The Seselj trial began in November 2007 and remains in progress as of this writing. 
Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67, availab/,e at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/cis/en/cis_ 
seselj_en.pdf. 
251. Alexander Zahar, Legal Aid, Self Representation, and the Crisis at the Hague Tribuna~ 19 CR. 
L. FOR. 241, 242 (2008). 
252. Marlise Simons, Sero Nationalist's Trial Begins in the Hague, N.Y. TIMES, November 8, 2007. 
253. Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecutor's Motion for Order 
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defense n.5 (May 9, 2003), availab/,e at 
http:/ /www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tdec/en/030509.htm. 
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immortal. "254 
Seselj has been far more successful than his predecessor at exploiting 
the protocols of accommodation adopted by the IC1Y during the 
Milosevic trial. At his.initial appearance before the Tribunal in February 
of 2003, he. declared his absolute resolve to represent himself and 
demanded essentially all of the accommodations already extended to 
Milosevic on the ground that "such practice cannot be changed from 
case to case."255 Shortly thereafter the prosecution filed a motion 
seeking to have counsel appointed to Seselj on the ground that he 
avowedly intended to "destroy" the Tribunal and that he intended "to 
use the Tribunal as a political stage and source of media attention."256 
The Trial Chamber acknowledged that Seselj was already "demonstrat-
ing a tendency to act in an obstructionist fashion . . . and making 
various frivolous demands framed in language inappropriate for a legal 
document."257 But the court nonetheless upheld his right to self-
represent and merely appointed, over the defendant's objection, a 
single standby counsel. The case thereafter struggled along with the 
defendant exploiting virtually every opportunity presented to him to 
offend the court. The vulgarity alone of his extensive written submis-
sions to the court became extraordinary.258 
Three-and-a-half years after his initial appearance and six months 
after Slobodan Milosevic died and his trial was terminated, the trial of 
Seselj was scheduled to begin in November 2006. But the debacle of the 
Milosevic trial was yet a fresh wound at the Tribunal. The trial chamber 
had endured enough and appeared determined to avoid a repeat 
performance by Seselj. In August, 2006, the court issued a preemptive 
254. Marlise Simons, Fiery Speech by Serbian Leader at Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007. 
255. Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecutor's Motion for Order 
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defense 11 8-9 (May 9, 2003), available at 
http:/ /www.icty.org/ x/ cases/ seselj/ tdec/ en/030509.htm. 
256. Id. 1 4 n.5. 
257. Id. 1 23. 
258. For example, Seselj wrote in reference to the Tribunal Registry: "You, all you members 
of the Hague Tribunal Registry, can only accept to suck my cock." With regard to another named 
individual associated with the Tribunal, he wrote: "'Shit remains shit even ifit is wrapped in gold.' 
Therefore, if this slime were to remove the black garment in which he appears that makes him 
look like a raven and put on a golden uniform, he would still be what he is, shit in a human form." 
And with regard to another named individual, he wrote: "How to tell him to kneel down and start 
sucking Dr. Vojislav Seselj's Orthodox dick, but only on cue 'bow and begin.'? How to simply tell 
him, monkey, eat shit, that's all you can?" Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on 
Assignment of Counsel, 1148-52 (Aug. 21, 2006), availableathttp://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/ 
tdec/en/ses-dec06082le.pdf. 
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ruling revoking Seselj's right to continue to self-represent.259 The court 
provided an extensive review of the beh<;tvior of the defendant which 
"compromise[d] the dignity of the Tribunal andjeopardize[d] the very 
foundations upo~ which its proper functioning is based. "260 The 
chamber provided a lengthy typology carefully delineating the defen-
dant's misbehaviors under the following headings: Obstructionist behav-
ior; Deliberate disrespect for the rules; Disruptive behavior; Intimida-
tion and slanderous comments in relation to witnesses; Accused's 
ability to defend himself; and, Warnings to the accused. 261 
The decision to revoke Seselj 's right to continue to proceed prose set 
in motion a contentious split between the Trial and Appeals Chambers 
that compromised the integrity of both the Trial Chamber and the trial 
proceeding itself. The Appeals Chamber overturned the trial court's 
decision and reinstated the defendant's right to self-represent. It did so 
on the narrow ground that the Trial Chamber had not provided the 
defendant with sufficiently specific warning prior to its decision. The 
Trial Chamber thereupon reinstated Seselj as counsel and reappointed 
standby counsel. The defendant immediately objected to the reappoint-
ment of standby counsel and became even more strident in his cam-
paign to disrupt the proceedings. The Trial Chamber once again 
attempted to draw the line and issued a set of findings related to the 
defendant's conduct since the reinstatement of his prose status: 
The Trial Chamber finds that the Accused has continued to 
deliberately disregard decisions by the Trial Chamber, in par-
ticular its Decision on Filing of Motions, submitting motions 
that are often tens of thousands of words over the limit set by 
the Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber finds that the Accused 
has repeatedly disrupted court hearings by deliberately and 
unreasonably interrupting the proceedings and by refusing to 
appear in court to represent himself. The Accused has been put 
on notice, and specifically warned by the Trial Chamber, that 
should his. disruptive and obstructionist conduct continue, the 
Trial Chamber will consider imposing counsel on the Ac-
cused.262 
And it did just that. In early November, 2006, the defendant went on 
259. Id. , 81. 
260. Id. , 77. 
261. Id. U 34-71. 
262. Seselj, Status conference, 8 November 2006, Closed Session, T. 766. 
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a hunger strike to protest the reappointment of standby counsel and 
refused to appear in court. On November 27, the Trial Chamber once 
again revoked the defendant's right to self-represent and ordered the 
trial to begin with the appointment of counsel.263 But once ·again the 
Appeals Chamber sided with the defendant in his stand-off with the 
trial court. The Appeals Chamber ruled that the Trial Chamber had 
incorrectly appointed standby counsel and nullified the trial proceed-
ings that had taken place up to that point.264 It ordered the trial to 
begin anew when the defendant "is fit enough to fully participate in the 
proceedings as a self-represented accused."265 The trial did not in fact 
recommence until almost one year later on November 7, 2007: 
The handling of Seselj 's case calls into question the very idea of 
international criminal justice as an orderly, rational, functional, 
legal system. One wonders how (if that were not the case) it 
could come to pass that a vexatious litigant who is the leader of 
a party of ultra-nationalists whose declared aim is to destroy the 
Tribunal, who regularly hurls insults at judges, prosecutors, and 
other Tribunal staff, who issues threats to potential witnesses 
and members of the public, and who is mentally unstable, has 
managed twice to win back the privilege of self-representation 
and is allowed to conduct his defense at trial at his pleasure with 
almost total impunity.266 
Milosevic has therefore become the Faretta of international law. It is 
the seminal case that was generously but foolishly decided and it has 
immediately spawned a humiliating spectacle of its own design. 267 
Fortunately, the other extant war crimes tribunals have not allowed 
263. See Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Request for Certification to Appeal 
Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel, 1 (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http:/ /www.icty.org/ 
x/cases/seselj/tdec/en/06.1205e.pdf. 
264. See Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial 
Chamber's Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel ,, 29-30 (Dec. 8, 2006) available at 
http:/ /www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/acdec/en/061208e.pdf. 
265. Id. 
266. Zahar, supra note 251, at 261. 
267. The arrest, in July, 2008 ofRadovan Karadzic, the fugitive former Bosnian Serb leader, 
who immediately claimed his right to· self-represent, will almost certainly require the ICIY to 
review its commitment to its Milosevic/Seselj protocols. His trial has not begun as of this writing but 
Karadzic has already informed the court of his heroic purpose in exercising his right to 
self-represent: "I'm not defending myself in actual fact. What I am defending are the people over 
there who have suffered .... It will of course be a precedent for small nations, small countries, not 
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themselves to be quite so taken in by the false prophet of Faretta. 
Although the right of self-representation appears in virtually the same 
form in the founding documents of all the other international criminal 
tribunals, all of the other courts have managed to avoid the creation of 
their own "Milosevic." The other tribunals have typically acknowledged 
the existence of the right of self-representation, when raised, but have 
then avoided its application by either relying upon a procedural default 
by the defendant268 or, more radically; by insisting that the unwaivable 
right to a fair trial trumps the subordinate right to proceed pro se. 269 
CONCLUSION 
The practice of self-representation was for centuries the default 
position for the common law trial. Its initial purpose and enduring 
legacy were to prevent or forestall the presentation of a fair and 
large ones." Prosecutor v. Karadzic, No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Status Conference 43 (Sept. 17, 2008), 
available at http:/ /www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/080917SC.htrn. 
268. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-A, Trial Judgment~ 65 (June 1, 
2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ cgi-bin/ texis/vtx/ refworld/ rwmain?docid = 4084f42f4& 
page=search (" [T] he Appeals Chamber finds that it was difficult for the Trial Chamber to discern 
any firm and unyielding desire on the part of the accused to represent himself. Even though 
Akayesu did, on several occasions, express the desire to defend himself, his attitude towards the 
Chamber suggested otheIWise"). For other ICTR cases expressing reluctance to recognize 
self-representation, see Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on 
Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw (Nov. 2, 2009), available at http:/ /69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/ 
cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/021100.htrn; Prosecutor v. Arsene Shalom Ntahobali, No. ICTR-97-
21-T Decision on Ntahobali's Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel, (June 22, 2001), available at 
http:/ /69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/ cases/Ntaholbali/ decisions/220601.htrn. 
269. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Augustine Gbao, et al, Decision on Application to Withdraw 
Counsel, No. SCSL-o4-15-T, 'I 15 (July 6, 2004) ("It is clear from examining all of the circum-
stances of this case that the interests of justice would not be served by allowing Mr. Gbao to be 
unrepresented before this Court. The Trial Chamber accordingly takes the position that it must 
safeguard the rights of the accused and the integrity of the proceedings before the Court by 
insisting that Mr. Gbao should continue to be represented by the Counsel that have represented 
him throughout these proceedings. We hold that in this regard that an accused person cannot 
waive his right to a fair and expeditious trial whatever the circumstances."). See also the very 
encouraging opinion of the same tribunal in another case where it denied self-representation with 
the following comment: "In arriving at this conclusion, we are guided by the opinion of Hon. 
Judge Reinhardt's in the case ofFarhad v. United States, where The Learned Judge said that the 
permitting of self-representation regardless of the consequences, threatens to divert criminal 
trials from their clearly defined purpose of providing a fair and reliable determination of guilt or 
innocence." Prosecutor v. Sain Hinga Norman, Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga 
Norman for Self-Representation, 1 25 No. SCSL-2004-14-T (June 8, 2004). With regard to Judge 
Reinhardt's opinion, see U.S. v, Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J., 
concurring). 
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equitable defense within the context of an increasingly adversarial 
system. Ironically, the practice was not installed by the Supreme Court 
as a constitutional right until after that Court had rendered the 
practice both obsolete and odious to the contemporary counsel-based 
adversarial system. Yet however ill-begotten the practice has been 
within the common law national systems, it is utterly ill-conceived as an 
adopted right within the normative and structural matrix of the contem-
porary institutions of international criminal justice. In the interna-
tional arena, the right is an example of a malignant reception from the 
common law without purpose or value, which must be aborted if the 
campaign to construct credible and durable institutions of interna-
tional justice is to have a fair chance. 
The new standard-bearer for this campaign is the ICC. The mission 
and structural design of the ICC are unique, and neither directly 
replicates that of any other court or tribunal, either national or 
international. The ICC is the first and only international criminal 
tribunal created without a designated, ad hoc mandate. It shares the 
retrospective ambition of the international tribunals of creating a 
judicial historical record by credible prosecutions of designated atroci-
ties, and the more prospective ambition of national criminal courts of 
deterring future crime. It is designed as a semi-autonomous, perma-
nent organ of unprecedented prosecutorial power with no guaranteed 
political or law enforcement support for its selected endeavors. The 
ultimate success of the court will therefore stand or fall on the demon-
strated integrity attached to its individual prosecutions. It is not a court 
with a wide margin for compromised prosecutions. It is highly unlikely 
that the judges and other legal personnel committed to the success of 
the court itself will find it tolerable to suffer the pointless compromises 
to their professional and institutional integrity common to prose cases. 
The right of self-representation is embodied within the articles of the 
ICC. Yet Article 121 of the Rome Statute provides that "[a]fter the 
expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this Statute, any State 
Party may propose amendments thereto." The Statute went into force 
in July, 2002. A Review Conference is planned for 2009.270 The States 
Parties should therefore seize this timely opportunity to remove the 
burden of self-representation from the trying campaign of interna-
tional criminal justice. 
270. Information regarding the proposed conference is available at http:/ /www.iccnow.org/ 
?mod= review. 
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